BILKENT UNIVERSITY

INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

GERMANY AND THE BOSNIAN WAR: AN ANALYTICAL SURVEY ON THE FORMULATION OF THE GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY FROM THE YUGOSLAV DISSOLUTION TO THE DAYTON ACCORDS, 1991 - 1995

BY

SEVGİ KURU AÇIKGÖZ

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

AUGUST, 1998

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

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

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

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

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ABSTRACT

The German unification and the collapse of Yugoslavia were major challenges to European stability in the first years of the post-Cold War era. The fall of the Communist bloc towards the end of the 1980s turned upside down all the parameters in Europe which used to remain serene since the end of the Second World War. The German unification was almost a natural consequence of the fall of Communism, since the division of the German state came into being after the Second World War, within the Allied powers' aim to restructure the European balance of power. The unified Germany was regarded by its partners as a challenge to European politics, which might overrule the EC/EU, and which therefore needed to be contained in one way or the other. As the EC was busy with adapting to the changes brought about by the German unification, the Yugoslav war broke out and became a trial case in determining the new parameters of European, as well as German foreign policy aims.

The EU, in the new era, aimed to stand up in the international arena as a political actor on its own. This included the minimization of American influence on European politics. The US also expected the Europeans to solve their problems on their own. To this end, Yugoslavia again was the trial case, where the US held back for a long time and waited for the EU to take the initiative. However, time proved that the EU member states were so busy with trying to curtail each other's influence that in the end they became unable to produce any policy and urgently required the US initiative for solution.

ÖZET

Almanya'nın birleşmesi ve Yugoslavya'nın dağılması Soğuk Savaş sonrasının ilk yıllarında, Avrupa'nın süregelmiş istikrarını sarsan en belirgin olaylar olmuştur. Komünist Blok'un 1980lerin sonlarına doğru çökmesi, İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan bu yana dingin bir seyir arz eden Avrupa parametrelerini tümüyle sarsmıştır. Almanya'nın bölünmesi II. Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra, İttifak Devletleri tarafından Avrupa'nın güç dengesi için elzem görülmüş bir olgu idi ve II. Dünya Savaşı sonrası kurulan düzenin ortadan kalkması, doğal olarak Almanya'nın birleşmesini beraberinde getirdi. Birleşik Almanya'nın ekonomik ve siyasi potansiyeli ile AT/AB içindeki dengeleri etkilemesi kaçınılmazdı. Hatta böylesi bir Almanya'nın AT içindeki muvazeneyi kendi lehine değiştireceği endişesini taşıyan Avrupa ülkeleri, 1990ların başından itibaren Almanya'yı dizginleme çabası içine düştüler. Tam bu sırada gelişmiş Avrupa'nın güney eteğinde, Yugoslavya'da savaş patlak verdi ve AT ülkelerinin kendi içindeki çekişmeleri ve yeni parametrelerin oturtulması için bir sınama alanı oluşturdu.

1990larla başlayan yeni dönemde AB, uluslararası ilişkilerde siyasi olarak daha aktif bir rol alma çabası içindeydi. Bu, ABD'nin Avrupa'daki etkisini en aza indirgemek demekti. AB Yugoslavya'daki savaşı bu amaca yönelik bir ilk olarak değerlendirdi ve ABD'yi uzun bir müddet dışarıda tutarak kendi kıtasındaki bu sorunu kendi başına çözmeye çalıştı. Fakat zaman geçtikçe savaş çözümsüz bir hal aldı ve Avrupalılar henüz Amerika'yı dışarıda tutarak siyasi yaptırımlar üretemediklerini fark etmek zorunda kaldılar.

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I feel grateful to my teacher Hakan Kırımlı for all the insights and encouragement he gave to me in the completion of this dissertation.

Last, but not least, I would like to thank my family for all their support; to my father for his encouragement and vision, to my mum for her patience and care, to my sister, Tülin, for her friendship and love. I would further like to express my special gratitude to my husband for the moral brace and motivation he gave me throughout.

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War brought about dramatic changes to Western Europe whose system had been working for the maintenance of stability. Since Europe was at the center of the bipolar system that was established after the Second World War, it had also, after 1989, become the center of the revolutionary systemic level transition. As in all radical transitions, this upheaval came with pain and a heavy burden onto the shoulders of the industrialized West Europeans. The unification of Germany and the dissolution of Tito's Yugoslavia could be regarded as the most important part of this upheaval. The fall of the Soviet bloc and the German unification as a consequence was the sign of a new era in which the West European powers needed to reformulate the political balance of the Continent. While the EC (European Community) was trying to adjust itself to the consequences of the German unification, a war broke out in Yugoslavia that caught the EC napping. The EC, and the new Germany were expected to have considerable political weight in the international arena and the war in Yugoslavia turned out to become the trial case serving to this expectation. The ensuing wars leading to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, particularly the one in Bosnia resulted in the death of thousands of civilians while the survivals either escaped or –thousands of women- were raped and humiliated. Due to their power struggle with one another, the West, for most

of the time during the war, appeared unable to formulate and implement deterrent policies.

The Germans had a special place within the West, since their reluctance was a very deep rooted one going back to their history. Their weight in world affairs had become undeniable after unification and they were expected to have more influence in international politics than ever before. However, coping with the past was not that easy for Germany and adjustment to the new role was not, therefore, forthcoming.

The topic under review here, namely, **Germany and the Bosnian War: An Analytical Survey on the Formulation of German Foreign Policy from the Yugoslav Dissolution to the Dayton Accords,** would require research and analysis at three levels: first, it requires a background analysis of German foreign policy traditions for a comprehensive understanding of Germany's policy formulation; second, it necessitates a careful study on the dynamics of Yugoslavia which held the country together and caused the dissolution afterwards and finally, it urges for an analysis on the sources that determine the scope of the German-EC and German-US relations.

The dissertation is composed of six chapters, four of which focus thoroughly on the events and the formulation of German policy; the other two consist of introduction and conclusion. Following the introductory first chapter, the second chapter attempts to give a historical background on German foreign policy formulation since 1949 with special reference to the circumstances that emerged after the Second World War. It describes the containment that Germany had faced during the Cold War and how this containment altered the German political culture. Upon the obstacles and opportunities cited in the first part, the second part of the chapter focuses on an analysis of German foreign policy formulation in the post-Cold War era.

The third chapter begins with a summary of the events that led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, together with the reactions to the dissolution from the outside world. An explanation is given, in the beginning of the chapter, on the factors that held the country together for almost four decades, together with a brief explanation as to how these cohesive factors brought about the end of Yugoslavia right after the death of Tito in 1980. The wars in Slovenia and Croatia are elucidated in the chapter as a consequence of the dissolution process. The last part of the chapter puts forth the EC attitude on the wars in Slovenia and Croatia and sets a deep

analysis on the factors leading to German recognition of Slovenia and Croatia earlier than its EC partners.

The forth chapter deals with the Bosnian War in the years 1992 and 1993 and the failed peace initiatives of the West. The important remarks in this chapter are about Germany's shift to passiveness in policy formulation due to the criticism it faced with the recognitions of Croatia and Slovenia and its sensitivity towards military contribution. The chapter sets out the judicial and psychological obstacles of the Germans in regard to military cooperation in Bosnia. The arguments of the German political elite, the view of the government and the opposition all are pieced together in this chapter.

The fifth chapter illustrates the involvement of the United States in 1994 and explains the road towards the settlement, leading to the Dayton Accord of November 1995. The chapter gives an ultimate analysis on the intra-Western struggle for prestige in respect to the war in Bosnia. A crucial part of the chapter examines the process leading to Germany's decision to deploy troops in Bosnia, which may be regarded as a revolution in the history of Germany's foreign policy. The last chapter, conclusion, is a concise assessment of German foreign policy in the Yugoslav crisis, in general, and in the Bosnia War, in particular.

CHAPTER II

GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1949

As the Second World War came to an end with the defeat of the German NAZI regime in 1945, the victorious Allied powers' main objective had been decided on: to prevent Germany from threatening the European peace and security ever again. This objective became a cornerstone in the reformulation of the postwar political structure of Europe. The plan on this political structure was proposed to the three major powers by the European Advisory Commission (EAC)[1] in 1944. The proposal foresaw the division of Germany into zones of occupation between the Soviet Union, the US and Britain. This division into occupational zones was ratified by the heads of states of the three powers in Yalta in February 1945. Besides the three major powers, there were two more states that were allowed to take steak from the division. Poland was granted the territories between Oder and east of Neisse rivers for compensation. France formed a zone of occupation from the zones of occupation of the US and Britain, since it was the country that experienced the severest damage from the NAZI regime. Moreover the capital, Berlin, was also agreed to be ruled by a joint administration of the US, the USSR, Britain and France with a division into four sectors between these states. The aim of the division was to both share the responsibility, as

well as the authority in Germany. The intention, at least on the Western side, was to continue the wartime cooperation with the Soviet Union for the reconstruction of Europe and Germany.[2]

The division at the 'heart' of the continent was regarded as a necessity for permanent stability in Europe. Germany was a large and industrialized country, and leaving Germany isolated for punishment as in the post World War I, would not be a solution. Because one of the factors leading to National Socialism in Germany was believed to be the feeling of isolation and humiliation that the German people developed after the defeat of 1918. Another political alternative that was debated for the treatment of Germany was neutrality. Especially Stalin was a staunch supporter of Germany's neutrality. However, the Western powers were aware that a country of Germany's size and potential would not remain neutral. In addition, a neutral Germany would cause a power vacuum at the center of Europe. Moreover, the continual insistence by the USSR on neutrality created the suspicion that a 'neutral' Germany would sooner or later fall into the arms of Communism. So, the division of Germany into zones of occupation with the purpose of a joint administration appeared to be the only solution for Germany, as well as for Europe.

The Potsdam Conference of August 1945 was the second decisive meeting between the US, Britain and the USSR. The significance of this conference was that it became clear between the Allied Powers that the wartime cooperation with the Soviet Union was an uneasy track to continue. Poland, whose annexation by NAZI Germany was the reason for entrance to war by Britain fell into a Communist dictatorship in the summer of 1945. The USSR was building a world based on its own ideological doctrine in the eastern part of Europe. Thus the new threat to European security was now the spread of Communism.

In response, the Western powers under the leadership of the US developed and implemented policies to contain the Soviet expansion to the West. The project of double containment, which was developed by the US, made up the core of this policy implementation. Washington's objective through this project involved two points: one was to contain the Soviet Union and keep it at arm's length; the second to restrain Germany through reconstruction and internationalization. Germany should become a democratic government, get economic self-sufficiency and be bound with multilateral, political and military treaties with the purpose of restrain.

> "A central feature of Allied and especially American policies toward the Federal republic in the postwar era was the intention.

> only superficially a paradox, to make the West Germans free and at the same time not free: free with respect to the personal liberties and constitutional safeguards that are the essence of a democratic political order, but not free to formulate and implement an independent foreign policy." [3]

In the year 1949, two German governments came into being in the zones of occupation: in the western part the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and in the eastern part the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The world was based on an ideological division of power with the US on the one side and the USSR on the other. The central place to the bipolar world was Europe which was divided from its center, Germany. And Germany was divided from its capital, Berlin. This division brought up a unique concept known as the 'German Question' that dealt with the existence of the two German states and the problems that emerged with these two states. The German question, was, indeed, an issue peculiar to the bipolar system and could not be overcome until the termination of this system.[4]

2.1. Germany's Foreign Policy During the Cold War

The constitution of the Federal German government voted in 1949 was surely not a sign for German absolute sovereignty. The status of occupational zones still existed de jure and continued to exist until 1955. However, even after 1955 and throughout the Cold War, Germany's foreign

policies were vulnerable to the constrains and opportunities of the bipolar system more than any other country in Europe.

The parameters of the postwar Europe were always formulated by the US in cooperation with Britain and France. These were the containment of Soviet threat and Germany's notorious past. The US aimed to build a military and economic cooperation in Europe against the Soviet threat. To make this policy work, West Germany should be fully integrated into this system.

> "Given the continent's serious economic and political problems, German issues were being gradually merged into a larger geographic and ideological context. With the Iron Curtain already drawn shut to the east, fears for the communization of Western Europe came to be mirrored in the fear of a Soviet takeover in Germany."[5]

In the late 1940s and early 1950s all west European democracies, together with the Federal Republic, broke with their past and rejected protectionist, nationalistic economic policies in favor of an open market. For the Western European states realized that an efficient European cooperation could only be possible with the German economy integrated into the European economy. All the financial aid for the economic reconstruction of Europe came from the US, under the Marshall Plan of 1947. In April 1948, the OEEC (Organization for European Economic Cooperation) –known as

OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) after 1960- was established with the signature of 16 European governments with the aim of implementing the Marshall Plan. In respect of this establishment, the Ruhr, which was composed of a high coal and steel industry, was to be under an international authority that would not involve the political separation of the region from Germany. The Plan also foresaw the establishment of a West German government; so Konrad Adenauer came to power as the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, and the Federal Republic of Germany was created under the auspices of the Western states. In 1951, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established for cooperation on the scarce and vitally important sources of coal and steel. The ECSC was a major step forward for reconciliation of Germany and France. It paved the way for a long process of economic integration and interdependence within the West European states. The same year, the Federal Republic also became a full member of the Council of Europe, and began to encourage unity and political cooperation among the European democracies.[6]

By the beginning of 1950s West Germany had made inroads in the way of respectability and the Allied control was liberalized. But there still existed a strong taboo on Germany on the issue of remilitarization. The Occupation

Statute, which was signed by the high commissioners and Adenauer in November 1949, provided for the continued demilitarization in the country and forbade Germany from building up an army of any kind. The prohibition was so strict that even glider planes and fencing were not allowed under the heading of military exercise.[7] In the meantime, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had been established in Washington in April 1949 between the West European powers and the US for the purpose of military cooperation and common defense. The year after, the NATO allies debated the issue of West German membership to the Atlantic Pact. The allies agreed that any policy leading to any kind of rearmament in Germany should not be allowed. So there did not exist any reason for German membership in NATO and the lifting of the ban on demilitarization. The reason, however, did urgently show up when in June 1950 South Korea was invaded by the Communist forces.

> "NATO military planning antedated Korea, but the conflict brought home to the possibility of analogous Soviet moves in Europe. Everyone was uncomfortably aware that a divided Germany resembled a divided Korea, the major difference being that a war in Germany probably could not be contained."[8]

Adenauer took the initiative of Korean War for regaining sovereignty for Germany. He offered the permission to form a federal police force against possible domestic subversions, as well as the establishment of an

international West European army, which would involve German contribution. By the end of 1954 the Atlantic Powers reached agreement on the German defense issue and came up with the so-called Spofford Plan. The plan foresaw the emergence of German military units under the control of NATO and a European Defense Community (EDC).[9] The Occupation Statute was lifted up in 1955. A few days later Germany was granted full membership to the Atlantic Pact and became de jure an equal partner of the Western alliance.

Germany, historically, was a central state in European geography with its face more towards the East. With the alliances to NATO and the ECSC, it became for the first time in its history a country looking more to west, and formulating its national interests upon this new policy, which was named as the Westpolitik, and which altered the German political culture from its basis. Throughout the following decades, Germany was to identify itself so strongly with this policy that it became the most faithful advocate of the West European integration process. The significant point in this policy, however, was that Adenauer did not intent to break bonds with the east with Westpolitik; instead, he aimed to gain support and trust from the West for Germany's basic aim, reunification.

During the first decades of the Cold War, the objective of all German politicians –whether social democrat or conservative- was to reunite Germany. Their difference was the means they offered for this ultimate objective. The right wing Christian democrat Adenauer believed that German unification could only be possible through giving confidence to the Western allies and cultivating their willingness for the process. The left wing Social democrats, on the other hand, rejected this view and preferred to conduct more independent diplomatic initiatives with the East. This second trend came to power as soon as the Westpolitik was settled and determined German foreign policy for long decades. The fact that Germany had established a Western tradition in the Adenauer period balanced and softened this trend. The political initiative of the Social democrats placed emphasis on the undeniable historical and cultural ties to the East and attempted to improve the relations of the Federal Republic with its Eastern neighbors.

This improvement became known as the Ostpolitik and made up the second phase of German foreign policy during the Cold War. The first indications of the Ostpolitik came up in the early 1960s with the Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, the successor of Adenauer. Erhard mentioned to his Western allies the dilemma of Germany between east and west, and that Germany could

not and should not ignore the East as long as its western alliance was not disturbed. The real name, which was to become identical with the term Ostpolitik, however, was Willy Brandt, the leader of the German Social Democrats of late 1960s and early 1970s, the Chancellor of the West Germany from 1969 to 1974.

> "An essential ingredient of our Ostpolitik was that we applied ourselves to our own affairs in a new and more positive manner instead of relying solely on others to speak for us. This meant that, while remaining in touch with our allies and retaining their confidence, we became the advocate of our own interests vis-a-vis the governments of Eastern Europe. By so doing we strengthened our voice inside the bodies devoted to West European, Atlantic and international co-operation. The Federal Republic became more independent – more adult, so to speak."[10]

The basic premise of Brandt's Ostpolitik was to improve social, political and economic ties with the East. Until the end of the 1960s, West Germany had declared itself as the sole representative of the German people, thereby rejecting the legitimacy of the GDR. So the first step came up in the form of recognition of GDR as a sovereign state. In the first half of the 1970s, West Germany concluded a series of treaties with the GDR, as well as the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. The Ostpolitik of Germany was not a policy implementation, independent from the Western allies of Germany. It is remarkable that the start of the Ostpolitik overlapped with the détente or, in other words, with the attempts

at normalization of relationship between the East and the West. In May 1972 the two major powers the US and the USSR concluded an agreement on the limitation of strategic arms.[11]

The Ostpolitik continued also after the Brandt era within the constrains of the bipolar system. The policy began to bear some fruits in the mid-1970s with the emergence of new self-confidence within the country. The past decades had brought the conservatives and the social democrats more towards a consensus on the basic objectives of German foreign policy. The treaties with the East and the growing economy put Germany into a more equal status with its Western partners. The Federal Republic had become a mature state which no longer depended on the protectorate of the US or the European partners.[12]

On the other hand, the recession brought about by the oil crisis was a determinant of political preferences in the 1970s. Economic relations had a high priority during this period which, in turn, resulted in revitalization of the European Economic Cooperation, something that had been set aside in the 1960s. The Bonn government went on to improve its relations especially with France within the context of the European Community. France had distrusted Germany in the 1960s and claimed it to be a puppet of the US.

However, the US influence and power in Europe began to decline in the 1970s due to economic and political deficiencies. Paris and Bonn decided to cooperate for the sake of European security on their own and thereby, promote the European economic integration. The European powers also continued their economic relations with the East, especially with the Soviet Union, whereas the US, exercised economic sanctions on the Soviet Union due to the Polish events. This led to an internal struggle between the US and the European powers, where the European powers, as an exceptional case put pressure on the US and lifted the economic sanctions against the Soviet Union in 1982.[13]

In 1983 elections, the Christian Democrats, after a long Social Democrat period, came to power and Helmut Kohl became the new chancellor. This did not lead to any dramatic changes in German foreign policy-making process, but there did occur very important political events. What Kohl did was to continue the Ostpolitik, as well as the West European economic integration process. Meanwhile, the change in the Soviet attitude on political and economic policies in the second half of the 1980s brought about a break-through in the East-West relations which resulted in 1989 in the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Berlin Wall, which was built in 1961, not only divided the two German states, but also symbolized the division of the two

opposing blocs. Therefore, when the Wall came down, it was obvious that more change was going to occur in the European geography.

Germany always felt constrained by the developments in its hinterland, since it is situated at the center of Europe. The bipolar system and the situation of the two German states were interrelated, such that the existence of one depended on the existence of the other. The fall of the Wall was the first step of a systemic level alteration in Europe. This was followed, a year later, with the reunification of the two German states. A new era both for Germany and Europe was beginning.

2.2. The Unification and the Reformulation of German Foreign Policy

Just as the division in the 1940s, the reunification of Germany required the compromise and ratification of the states, which established the divided Germanies. At the end of January 1990, the US declared the necessity of German unification and called upon the interested parties for the regulations of the status of this new Germany. On 13 February 1990, the representatives of the four powers and the representatives of the two German governments met to discuss the issues concerning the German unification. These negotiations were named as the 'Two plus Four' negotiations, and dealt with

the security and political status of unified Germany as well as with a clear-cut description of the frontiers of the new German state. The talks were concluded on 12 September 1990 and the four Powers agreed to leave off all their political authority, which they had possessed in the two Germanies until that date. Thus the German question, in one sense, was resolved and Germany four decades after it was divided regained full sovereignty as well as unity.[14]

But in some sense a German question was still present. The new German question was concerned with the place and political weight of the new Germany within a European and world context that was going through a historical change due to the fall of the Communist Bloc. Europe and the world was faced with a systemic-level revolution. Germany was at the center of this revolutionary change, since all its structure was based on the continuation of the Cold War period. Therefore, Germany's place within Europe needed to be redefined both by the outsiders as well as the Germans themselves. This included a reformulation of German foreign policy in regard to the new emerging constrains and opportunities.

The first determinant in German foreign policy in the new era would certainly be its relations with the other EU member states, especially its

relations with France. Throughout the Cold War the interdependency among the West European states had increased through the EC/EU process. French-German relations had made up the core of this integration process. Being the largest country of the Union, Germany did have significant influence within the EU. But this influence had been based on economic issues, since, politically, the country had had a long tradition of passiveness. The French-German cooperation, in fact, was that Germany had been tackling the economic issues, whereas France was leading the political issues of the Community. Germany had been defined as an economic giant, but a political dwarf, which actually pointed to the dilemma of German foreign policy. In the new era, the country still was and would be trying to overcome this dilemma and articulate its view on political issues. With the highest population and the strongest economy, Germany was expected to become more influential within the Community after the reunification. It was also expected to further its political weight –heavily, if not as heavy as its economic power- within the Community.[15]

At this point relations with France was of prior significance. France, as well as the other members in the Community should not have any doubt that Germany would intend to overrule the EC. These doubts of the outside world were based on historical experiences and images of a powerful

Germany. One of the basic aims of the postwar period was to prevent a strong Germany. Now that a strong Germany had reemerged, old fears had come up to surface. Right after the unification, scenarios on the emergence of a 'Fourth Reich' were made. Even by 1995, according to a public opinion poll, half of the French people recalled 'Hitler' when they were asked on the characteristics of the German people.[16] However, the Germans themselves were also very sensitive about the historical perceptions of their neighbors and would want to avoid the blame of such perceptions at any cost. This issue became a dilemma in Germany's foreign policy reformulation: on the one side Germany would try to further its influence within the EC/EU, on the other it was constrained by its notorious past.

Indeed, there did not exist a chance for Germany to revive the past. Because during the four decades of the Cold War, West Germany had become strongly integrated into the EC/EU and had started to define its national interests within the European context. The EC/EU process had become a source of identity for Germany more than any other EU member state. The Federal Republic seemed to be the most faithful advocate of the EC/EU process. When defining Germany's overweighing place within the new Europe, the German government on several occasions emphasized its wish of a 'European Germany' instead of a 'German Europe'.[17]

With the fall of the Communist Bloc, Eastern European states had opened their gates to the liberal world and were expecting to become part of the West European integration process in one way or the other. As being at West Europe's frontier to the East, Germany was more concerned about the East European states than its Western allies. Instability in the East due to dramatic changes would firstly and directly affect Germany.

> "We Germans have returned in 1990, within a more difficult world, to the Mittellage of Europe. A Mittellage means that one has several neighbors with convergent, often contradicting interests which it has to coordinate in order to claim itself to be cooperative within that circle."[18]

Germany's special care to its eastern neighbors is more than a consequence of geographical conjuncture. Germany had developed immense economic relations with the Eastern bloc countries during the Cold War. In addition, there are historical and cultural ties between Germany and its eastern neighbors. Moreover, stability in East Europe was of vital importance in the new era, because the East was the source of revolution in the European system, and things were altering at a dramatic speed. Ignorance about the region would import instability and uncertainty first to Germany and then affect all West European democracies.[19] So German interests in the region, in some sense, had been overlapping with those of the EU. Thus, Germany,

at every opportunity, put strong emphasis on the East European countries' integration into the West, to which they were admiringly looking forward. The issue of East European states became an issue of Europe, and Germany managed to obtain priority in favor of the East European states within the widening process of the EU.[20]

One of the most vitally important actors in German foreign policy, throughout the Cold War was certainly the US. The US was the determining factor in the reconciliation and normalization of Germany's relations towards its European partners. From time to time German-US relations had been better than its relations within the Continent. With the unification, the outlook of German-US relations also needed reformulating. The attachment to the United States was based on security concerns, namely on NATO partnership. A new concept, "partner in leadership" emerged in regard to German-US relations in the new era.[21] In fact Germany did try to use the initiative brought forth by this new role. The first striking German contribution in accordance with this new role was felt in the NATO's formal Strategy Review and Force Reconstructing program of 1991. With the fall of the communist bloc, NATO required a redefinition of its objectives and German officials in this respect argued that the new risk for the West was instability and uncertainty of East European origin. So the task

should be cooperative peace building with the nations of the East as well as to continue alliance peace-keeping. By succeeding in its argument, Germany –after its initiative within the EU- managed to obtain a prior position for the East European countries within NATO.

The other dimension of Germany's security parameter was the European defense initiative, WEU, which was still going through a stage of maturity. It was based on a French proposal that aimed to minimize US military superiority in Europe and contain Germany within a continental defense system. Germany also strongly advocated the evolution of this European security identity within the European Union. In 1991 and 1992 the Bonn government sided with France for developing the WEU and CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe). Having NATO on the one side, and supporting the strength of a European defense community on the other, leads to another reality in German policy orientation: the indecisiveness between a US-led or a French-led European security.[22]

In regard to foreign policy formulation, the social and psychological mood within the country should also be looked at in detail. Due to all the political experiences of the past 40 years, the German people have developed a certain kind of political culture that basically, opposes power relying on

armed forces, is highly sensitive to humanitarian and ecological issues, and defends self-determination of nations at all costs.[23] Since Germany itself has freshly experienced the reunification, it has a rather emotional perspective on any act that does seek independence. Actions which would be named as secessionism by other European powers can be perceived in Germany as natural aspiration to self-determination. Related to the military containment of the Cold War years as well as to the speculations made on Germany about its history, the Federal government showed great sensibility in the new era to avoid any military initiative by Germany outside the criteria described in the Cold War. Again due to the traditions of the Cold War decades, Germany's and German people's main focus has been on the economic issues both before and after the unification. Economic stability and well-being of the German people continued to be a focal point in German foreign policy in the new era. In fact most of German political initiatives try to serve the development of German economy in some means or the other. Moreover, the German government seemed very much vulnerable to the demands of the public opinion in the new era. Therefore, they felt the need to give priority to the point of view of the German people.

To sum up, German foreign policy parameters are determined by several internal and external dynamics. Germany's economic strength is still the

prior positive element at hand for Germany. Built upon this element the country tries to widen its political perspectives within its multilateral alliances.[24] The EU is one of the main determinants of German foreign policy, though relations with the US remain vitally important. If these two, the EU and the US, do not see eye to eye during a particular crisis, it causes indecisiveness in German politics from time to time. In regard to military issues, the country seems to be extremely careful and refrains from doing anything that would give rise to misperceptions among its allies, because the Germans themselves, in their unconscious mind, still carry the feeling of guilt about their past. Therefore, the Federal Republic shows reluctance in widening the use of Bundeswehr parallel to the demands of the new period. Moreover, due to the geopolitical location, as well as the economic and cultural ties, Eastern European states do make up an important part of the German foreign policy formulation. In addition, the domestic political and social structure do have an inevitable impact on the government's foreign policy decisions. As in any well-established democratic state, German governments feel the need to respond to the demands of the public in order to continue its existence. Thus the German foreign policy formulation during the dissolution of Yugoslavia requires an analysis upon the consideration of the domestic and international opportunities and constrains laid out.

CHAPTER III

THE YUGOSLAV DISSOLUTION AND GERMAN ATTITUDE

3.1. A Brief History of Yugoslavia and Factors Leading to its Dissolution

Yugoslavia had been a created state of the twentieth century and its existence was a direct consequence of the circumstances and political developments in the Balkans after the two world wars. The first formation of a Yugoslavian state was a result of the post WWI Balkan settlements. The Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, together with the Bosnians and the Montenegrins, formed a common state in 1918 under the Karadjordjevic dynasty with a limited form of parliament. However, right from the beginning, there existed strong friction between the divergent cultures of Yugoslavia. Especially the Croats and the Serbs were not getting on well.[25]

The first Yugoslav state was over with the invasion of Axis forces in the Second World War during which a civil war erupted in Yugoslavia where the racist Croat Ustashas took the support of Hitler, while both Serb and Croat Communists under Tito fought against the Ustashas. The Ustashas were allowed by Hitler to set up a greater 'Independent State of Croatia' in

the Balkans. The Serbs became one of the main victims of WWII. By 1945 the Yugoslav nightmare was over and Tito, the Croat origin charismatic communist leader, managed to reunite and establish the Socialist Federal Yugoslav Republic.[26]

As mentioned earlier, Tito's Yugoslavia was composed of people from different ethnic and religious basis. Six republics, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia. Macedonia, Bosnia-Hercegovina (hereafter Bosnia), Montenegro and two autonomous regions under Serbia, Kosovo and Metohija (hereafter Kosovo/a) and Vojvodina existed within Yugoslavia. Josip Broz Tito managed to hold together all these divergent republics and autonomous regions with the master of his unique communist dictatorship until his death in 1980. He established his own type of communist regime after Stalin expelled Yugoslavia from the Comintern in 1948. His anti-Soviet stance earned him credibility and support in the West. And with Western financial aid Yugoslav economy boomed from the 1950s to 1970s. Besides, Tito actively became one of the leading figures of the third way in international politics. the Non-Alignment Movement. All the success, however, was not only due to Tito's intelligence, but also to the constrains and opportunities of the bipolar system. The multinational body of Yugoslavia was to start

crumbling with Tito's death and eventually fell apart with the end of the bipolar system.[27]

Tito had always aimed to achieve a balance among the different nationalities of Yugoslavia. To this end, he enacted several constitutional amendments. The most important of these amendments was enacted in 1974, when the Bosnians, Macedonians and the Montenegrins were given political recognition as nations. Until 1974, the nation status had been granted only to the Slovenes, the Croats and the Serbs. In addition, there were two ethnic minorities that were given the status of nationality in 1974, namely, the Albanians of Kosovo/a and the Hungarians of Vojvodina. Vojvodina was composed of a Serb majority population, though with a significant Hungarian and a smaller Croat minority, whereas in Kosovo/a people were 90 percent of Albanian origin. With the 1974 amendment these two regions, which were initially part of Serbia, gained an autonomous status just below that of a full republic with the ability to construct their own courts, police and territorial defense. They were also allowed direct participation in decision-making at the federal level, bypassing Serbia. Tito, through this process, aimed to keep Serbia, the largest republic of the country, under control. He appeared to have thought that otherwise Serbia would dominate

Yugoslavia, destroying all the chances for a balance between all the republics.[28]

After Tito, Yugoslavia was to be ruled by a kind of 'term presidency'. However, as soon as Tito was gone, each republic began to put emphasis on its own national interests due to both economic and political problems. Towards the middle of 1980s, there was increasing uneasiness against Serbia in various parts of Yugoslavia, in particular, in Slovenia, Croatia, and Kosovo/a. At that stage, Yugoslavia was confronted with severe economic problems. Basic necessities of consumption were scarce and highly expensive. This led to individuality among the republics. Especially Slovenia and Croatia were better off economically and were not willing to take the burden of the whole country. Therefore, they were proposing a loose confederation for Yugoslavia with the retention of only an economic union and cooperation in issues of foreign policy and defense.[29]

In Serbia, on the other hand, nationalism was on the rise. The Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences issued a Memorandum in 1986, which claimed that the amendments of 1974 constitution were unfair, and which demanded the termination of irredentist and separatist movements of the Kosovo/a Albanians. It also demanded that the continual anti-Serb

propaganda all over Yugoslavia should be stopped. The Memorandum maintained that the Serbs in Croatia had always been discriminated against and even subjected to genocide. This was a modernized version of the dream of Greater Serbia. This Greater Serbia included Bosnia, the bulk of Croatia, Montenegro and Macedonia. The definition of the frontiers was not only due to historical arguments, but also due to present economic conditions. Croatia was rich of oil and gas, and also hosted most of the money spinning tourist industry in Yugoslavia. Bosnia had some natural resources, but more significantly, much of Yugoslavia's arms industry was located on its territory.[30]

Built upon this ideology, in 1987 Slobodan Milosevic got the upper hand in the fight over leadership for Serbian Communist Party. In his first visit to Kosovo/a, having taken up his new job, he made a point of speaking on behalf of both the Serbian and Montenegrin minorities there which in turn earned him extensive popularity within Serbia and Montenegro. In January 1989, he extended his control over Montenegro by means of a political coup. In March 1989, Serbia, unilaterally lifted the autonomous status of Kosovo/a and Vojvodina. Student upheavals and demonstrations took place in Kosovo/a upon this action. But the federal army which was under heavy control of Serbia crashed the demonstrations by force. Slovenia and Croatia

protested the act by pulling back their forces from the federal army. When Milosevic appeared adamant, the Slovenes and Croats then stopped paying taxes to the federal government, claiming that it was used for Serbian national interests.[31]

In March and April 1990, the first multiparty elections of the past fifty years were held in Slovenia and Croatia respectively; in both, the parties favoring national sovereignty and proposing looser confederation for Yugoslavia won the elections. The same year, the Bosnian elections, brought to power also a non-communist government. The end of 1990 added Macedonia to this change where the communists only formed the little partner in the coalition government. Only in Serbia and Montenegro did the communists held on to power. Thus the disagreements among the republics deepened due to the differences of political preferences where especially the non-communist governments of Slovenia and Croatia wanted to weaken the centralization, but the communist government of Serbian republic insisted firmly on more centralization.[32]

On 23 December 1990, Slovenia held a plebiscite in which almost ninety percent of the Slovenian citizens authorized the Slovenian parliament to declare independence if in six months no positive conclusion could be

reached for a new constitution of a looser confederation. The last straw for the Slovenes and Croats emerged when the Serbs and Montenegrins blocked the confirmation of the Croat Stipe Mesic as chairman of the Federal presidency. This action led to Croatian and Slovenian declaration of independence without actually seceding from Yugoslavia, in order to give it a last chance for compromise. In the first days of January 1991, the representatives of Slovene and Croat governments met and declared that they would, starting with 28 December 1990, not be obliged with federal duties and nor for the federal foreign debts.[33] Further negotiations continued between Serbia on the one hand, and Slovenia and Croatia on the other in the first half of 1991, which produced no agreement. Slovenia proclaimed its independence and took control of its borders on 23 June 1991 and Croatia on 24 June.

3.2. The Wars in Slovenia and Croatia

The proclamation of independence gave the Federal Army of Yugoslavia (JNA), the excuse to attack Slovenia. This was the first step of the horrible, bloody war of Yugoslavia which would go on with an accelerating terror in the following four years.

When, on 25 June 1991, the Serbianized JNA attacked Slovenia, the Western public was shocked while Western governments were trying to decide whether the issue was a domestic problem of Yugoslavia or an aggression of one state on the other. The Serbs dreamed to conclude their work before the West decided on the subject. However, the Slovenians put up a well-organized resistance and the JNA soon ran out of steam. The Slovenian resistance resulted in an unexpected defeat for the Serbs.

As the war in Slovenia was in full-swing, President Tudjman of Croatia sat back and watched the developments, although he had earlier promised the Slovenian President Kucan support and cooperation in December 1990. Moreover he let the Federal army pass through Croatian territory to attack Slovenia. By this way Tudjman thought to have secured his country; however, this policy nearly led to the destruction of Croatia.[34]

By mid July the Serbian and the Federal Army leaders had been defeated and, therefore, they decided to let Slovenia go. Therewith they turned their face to Croatia, which, they concluded, was much more important for 'Greater Serbia'. Indeed, the situation in Croatia was more suitable for the Federal Army with the 11 percent Serb minority already armed and organized secretly for a possible attack. The Croats were mostly unprepared

for such an eventuality, since they thought that their cooperation with the Serbs in the war in Slovenia would save them. All this proved miscalculation.[35]

Thus a full-blown war began in Croatia between the well-armed Serbs and the unprepared Croatian defense forces soon after the war in Slovenia ended. The Federal Army intervened under the pretext of separating the warring sides and by so doing gave extensive support to the local Serb forces. In September 1991, the Serbs captured the Krajina region and embarked on a large-scale ethnic cleansing campaign; Croats were either killed or forced out of the region. The JNA targeted Croatia's most famous tourist resorts. including Dubrovnik, and slaughtered thousands of Croats.[36]

3.3. Germany's Attitude at the Onset of the War within its European Constrains

As late as 20 June 1991 of the CSCE conference in Berlin, the German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher declared that Germany was keen to preserve Yugoslavia as a single entity. This, indeed, reflected the overall European view. Since the fall of the Communist bloc, Europe was going through dramatic changes. The changes brought about a certain amount of

unpredictability which, in turn, could endanger the ongoing European stability that the Western powers had managed to maintain in the previous four decades. Therefore the Europeans adopted a policy that favored the preservation of Yugoslavia at all costs and forestall instability in Europe. Yugoslavia, according to the Europeans, resembled the Soviet Union and a Yugoslav dissolution could have negative impacts on the unity of the Soviet Union, which the Europeans and the US were in favor of holding together with Gorbachev at its head.

> "Yugoslavia's troubles became visible at a time when the West was bewildered by the collapse of Communism and the break-up of the Soviet empire, which had reined in the turbulent peoples of Eastern Europe. ...the European Community, as it turned into the European Union, was in the middle of a public argument about where it was going. The Yugoslav Crisis threatened to destabilize the continent when Europe as a whole was trying to adjust to the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War. The EU, seeking a united international role, was forced into the Yugoslav mess, first as mediator, then as arbiter. It had prestige and influence, but it was not a security organization, and it had certainly not been put together to deal with civil wars outside its territory. The Twelve talked about a common foreign policy. They hoped to acquire one in handling the breakup of Yugoslavia... some feared the consequences that the breakup of Yugoslavia could have in the Soviet Union, or even at home. Others rushed in to stake their share of influence... [37]

A week later, as the EC prime ministers and foreign ministers met in Luxembourg, the JNA forces had entered Slovenia and war started. In response, the Community dispatched the 'troika', the past , present and the

coming foreign ministers of the Presidency of the European Council of Ministers, for a mission of mediation to Yugoslavia. In June troika was composed of Gianni de Michelis (Italy), Jacques Poos (Luxembourg) and Hans van den Broek (Netherlands). Its aim was to establish a cease-fire in Yugoslavia, which came up on 7 July with the Brioni agreement that foresaw the JNA troops leaving Slovenia in the following three months. The EC would monitor the events with a semi-military organization, the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), which would then operate within the framework of the CSCE. The agreement also pointed to a looser confederation for Yugoslavia The Europeans regarded this as a triumph of their diplomacy in stopping the war; where, in fact, the fighting had stopped, as will be seen below, due to the Serbs exhaustion and the successful resistance the Slovenes had put up against it.[38]

In the meantime, the already existing public pressure in Germany was increasing with the aim of pushing the Federal government to take the initiative to stop the war. The public argued that recognizing Slovenia and Croatia would put an end to the fighting and eventually finish all the ongoing bloodshed. Based upon this view, the German Chancellor, as early as 2 July, assured the German public that he would press for the principle of self-determination which Germany itself had always sought. Germany

declared its view in the EC foreign ministers summit on 5 July, but was highly criticized and isolated. The German proposal was seen in direct opposition to the Community's spirit of cooperation. The Franco-British-led view that Yugoslavia should be held together at any cost dominated the conference. The EC appointed Lord Carrington to operate the negotiations of the European plan. During the same period, the UN appointed Cyrus Vance as the special envoy for the negotiations of Yugoslavia.[39]

The war in Croatia continued throughout July and August with Europe unable to impose any cease-fire. Although the EC monitors were appointed for Croatia under Brioni, they could not enter Croatia until the cease-fire on 2 September. A day after the cease fire, it was announced that the EC conference on Yugoslav peace and reconciliation would be held in the Hague on 7 September under the leadership of Lord Carrington. 'The talks would be on the basis of three principles: no unilateral changes of borders, protection of rights for all minorities, and full respect for all legitimate interests and aspirations.'[40] While Carrington stated cease-fire as a precondition to start negotiations, right after the beginning of the Conference he had to forget about his previous statement since fighting restarted in Croatia. After the opening session of the Conference, Carrington began a series of private meetings with all the Yugoslav leaders and foreign

ministers in an attempt to mediate. Several temporary cease-fires were concluded during his negotiations, mainly due to the parties' need of pause instead of a will for a permanent compromise.[41] September ended with the imposition of a UN arms embargo against all the Yugoslav territories.

At the beginning of October, the fighting intensified as the 90-day moratorium on the Slovenian and Croatian declarations approached towards its end. Tudjman ordered full mobilization of its army and the JNA responded with renewed attack across Croatia, including bombardment of the historic port of Dubrovnik. On 6 October the EC, on the basis of the reports from ECMM, identified JNA as the chief offender, whereas the German foreign minister Hans Dietrich Genscher had declared the Serbs as the main aggressor in the conflict as early as August. Genscher had also proposed the imposition of economic sanctions on Serbia the same month which only could come into being in November, and that –despite the German opposition- on all parties. It was only after the fall of Vukovar in December that the sanctions, upon the German pressure, was limited to Serbia and Montenegro.[42] By October Germany had increased its pressure for recognition within the EC framework and was threatening to act unilaterally outside it. Upon tremendous German pressure, Carrington proposed a Draft Convention which agreed that those republics seeking

independence would gain it under certain conditions including provisions for minorities and the maintenance of a single economic space through a customs union. The plan was accepted by all the republics of Yugoslavia, except Serbia. Thus Carrington's plan came to no avail. By mid-November the Community appeared to be passing the first hand in the negotiations to the UN envoy Cyrus Vance.

Towards the end of 1991, the dissolution process of the Soviet Union, which the Europeans had tried to avoid looked imminent. That meant that one of the major arguments of the EC for insisting to hold Yugoslavia together was eventually disappearing. In the meantime, the Maastricht process had been finalized and a new era had begun in the EC (hereon EU). Whereas the EC foresaw cooperation and unification on economic issues, the European Union (EU) process beginning with Maastricht deepened the interdependence between the West Europeans. In this new era, the EU would begin acting as a single entity on political and security issues which, in turn, was expected to challenge the international politics. Under these altered circumstances, Germany intensified its argument on the recognition of independence of the Yugoslav republics. After long debates on the structure and time of the issue, the recognition was accepted in December 1991 by the EU in principle. A special commission was established for the

purpose of assessing which republics met the requirements set by the Union. The Commission was headed by the French Constitutional Expert Robert Badinter and searched for the existence of respect for territorial integrity, minority rights and establishment of democratic institutions. Two republics, Slovenia and Macedonia stood out, meeting the required conditions. Croatia, on the other hand, needed to improve the conditions for its minorities. The Croat government promised to take necessary measures as soon as possible. Following the report of the Commission, on 17 December 1991, the EU decided to grant Slovenia and Croatia recognition. Macedonia, on the other hand, although meeting all requirements, could not gain recognition due to the arbitrary veto of Greece.

> "Thus, it was agreed that recognition of the two Balkan states should not occur before January 15, 1992, and that to give the EC strategic *volte-face* a modicum of orderliness, a five-member EC judicial commission would be established to assess applications from those Yugoslav republics seeking independence and diplomatic recognition."[43]

Though the EU had stated that it would put the recognitions into practice in 1992; Germany, as Chancellor Kohl promised, declared its recognition of Slovenia and Croatia 'before Christmas of 1991'. Germany's rush that was highly criticized outside, had impacts both on domestic and international politics.[44]

3.4. Causes and Impacts of the German Push for Recognitions

Germany's 'earlier' recognitions of Slovenia and Croatia seemed to be an extraordinary case for German foreign policy traditions. However, there were several domestic and international elements that led to Germany's rush for the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.

First of all, Germany was the EC member state that was touched directly by the drawbacks of the war in Yugoslavia due to its geographical position. From the beginning of the second half of 1991 onwards, thousands of refugees from the former Yugoslav territories – according to statistics by the end of 1992 - some 200.000 fled to Germany.[45] The Yugoslavians were initially the second largest group of Gastarbeiters in Germany. When the war erupted 500.000 Gastarbeiter of Slovene and Croat origin were already residents in Germany. But this number increased with refugees that put a heavy economic as well as social burden on the country. Having left no other topic at hand in the last forty years, economic prosperity and social well-being had become the utmost important one in German society. In

1991 the country had just overcome the economic burdens of the unification, and the German people were hoping to go back to their prosperous and peaceful life. The problem of refugees was however, a surprise issue not of a pleasant type.

In addition, the German public opinion and the media had developed a high sensitivity on humanitarian issues, again somehow related to German non armament during the Cold War and Germany's notorious past that they have always wanted to cover in their own consciousness. The Germans could not stand to watch the blood and brutality of a war every night on their televisions. The places shown on television screens as being destroyed by the Serbs were familiar to the German people as their holiday places. This familiarity also made them more sensitive on the issue.[46]

The public opinion's pressure to take an initiative to stop the war was increasing in such a manner that the politicians could not ignore it. It was an exceptional topic upon which both the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats expressed full agreement. Therefore, would not be politically a sound decision to ignore an issue that galvanized the public. The Liberal Democrat Foreign Minister, Hans–Dietrich Genscher was becoming increasingly worried about the coming closer of the two opposing major

political parties of the country, since the existence of the Liberal Democratic Party was secured on the dispute between the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats, which, in turn gave the opportunity to the Liberal Democrats to be a partner of all the governments that came to power since the end of the 1960s. Genscher obviously felt the need to implement a policy which, he thought, would put an end to the war in Yugoslavia. The recognitions were intended to stop the bloodshed in the Balkans without taking into consideration the Serb ambiguity of a 'Greater Serbia'.

> "Genscher came under sudden and unexpected domestic pressure to revise the existing policy on Yugoslavia, not because Germany had any geopolitical interest in the Balkans but because the German political parties agreed that the violence in Yugoslavia threatened European stability, and that the main culprit was Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and the Serb-dominated Yugoslav People's Army."[47]

The Germans were also so sensitive about the issue because their personal experiences differed from that of the other EC member states. The freshly united Germany was more of an advocate for nations' right to self-determination than its European allies, which were faced with challenges to their own soil; the British have had a deep-rooted conflict with the Irish secessionist move, IRA; Italy had barely resolved the South Tyrol question with its German-speaking minority and was beset by the revolt of the Northern Leagues against the corruption of the centralized state. The French

government, on the other hand, faced endemic terrorism by Corsican nationalists. It was thus hardly surprising that the French Foreign Minister, Roland Dumas, felt the need to declare 'It is not the role of the EC to promote the independence of peoples.'[48]

The German attitude did have a loud impact on the international arena. It was looked upon suspiciously and regarded –by some- as the revival of German nationalism of the 1930s. Bonn was even accused of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, which, in fact by then, had already become an inevitable conclusion. However, somebody should be singled out for the guilt of the continuation of the war; and Germany was selected. The Serbs seized upon it, claiming that the historical Germanic-Catholic alliance was reestablishing itself to discriminate the Serbs; the 'Fourth Reich' came into being and was willing to annex southeast Europe again. The fact that the Italians and the Hungarians were the first states to follow the German initiative had given the Serbs further ammunition for their propaganda machine.[49]

The German initiative also received criticism from its EU partners. Lord Carrington, for instance, blamed Kohl and Genscher to have flamed the war in Yugoslavia. Kohl and Genscher were accused of betraying their European

partners. The German recognition, overall, nullified the relevance of the Badinter plan, through which the EU aimed to impose its criteria for recognition on Croatia, which lacked the institutional arrangements for minority rights, and which had accepted a constitutional improvement of those before gaining recognition. Now that recognition was gained without the fulfillment of the preconditions, Croatia would be less eager to improve the conditions for its minorities. In order to overcome this blame Genscher pushed the Croatian government to revise its constitution, meeting the Badinter objections. The Croat government proposed, upon this pressure, a constitutional amendment which was adopted by the Parliament five months later, in May 1992. The legitimacy of the amendment, however, was little, since it was a result of face saving for Germany. The matter concerned the public debate and the compromise and negotiation of the government and the minority communities. But this was not the case, thus Genscher's initiative came to no avail. The incident was likely to encourage other republics seeking recognition and lacking the same preconditions.[50]

Moreover, Germany was also accused of having ignored the guilt of Croatia in the war and directed all the evil only on Serbia. The reason for this German attitude was apparently a reaction to the pro-Serb stand in the other major capitals of Europe, namely Paris and London. According to one

argument, the British and French reluctance to define the Serbs as the major aggressor of war forced Germany to take an anti-Serb stance.[51] According to another, the British and French stance was a reaction to Germany. Britain and France did have fears on the future role of a united Germany.

> "Historical memory in Western Europe is not as insignificant as many Euro politicians pretend, and a united Germany did change the political landscape of Europe. Moreover the cost of uniting Germany has created a number of difficulties for Western European economies. So I think that the problem of Germany was then transferred to the Balkan situation, and in a curious way. European actions or decisions were less a response to the question of what path to find for the successor states of Yugoslavia and more a part of political fencing that went on between the Germans and their Western allies. Perhaps these divisions would have come over other issues, but they came precisely over the issue of Yugoslavia, and demonstrated amply, in 1991-92 –the year of European unity- the extent to which Europe was not really united and not really a political entity."[52]

Despite all, Chancellor Kohl presented the recognitions as a victory of German diplomacy at home. In reality, the Kohl - Genscher initiative was a signal of the limits to which the EU diplomacy could formulate a common foreign policy. The policy pointed to the dilemma of German diplomatic preferences squeezed in between its responsibility within the EU and its will to become more active on behalf of its increased weight. The issue of 'premature' recognitions flamed the debates on Germany's political weight within the European and world political context. Germany was expected to

take a more active role in the international politics, but this role should not become an overruling influence on Europe. The same dilemma was also present within the country as well; the government was trying to show a political power close, if not equivalent, to its economic weight, at the same time intending to avoid any misperceptions which its allies might develop on the German image. Thus the relatively passive German foreign policy on the Yugoslavian dissolution at the begining of 1992, can be better examined under these contradictory preconditions.[53]

CHAPTER IV

THE WAR IN BOSNIA IN 1992-1993 AND GERMAN DIPLOMACY

4.1. Beginning of the War in Bosnia 1992

Bosnia was the province that lay in the south-west of the former Yugoslav territories.[54] Among other tribes the Slavs entered the region in the seventh century and were named after the territory, Bosnians.[55] Until 1180 power changed hand in Bosnia between the Byzantine Empire, the Croat and the Serb Kingdoms. From 1180 onwards the authority began to settle down and Bosnia became an independent kingdom with its own Catholic Church. The Ottoman conquer of the kingdom of Bosnia came in 1463. Beginning with the following century, most of the Bosnian population converted voluntarily to Islam in big numbers, such that the ratio changed in favor of the Muslims.

After remaining under Ottoman rule for four centuries, Bosnia passed to the Austro-Hungarian rule in 1878 due to the weakening of the Ottoman authority. Meanwhile, by June 1914 Serb nationalism had flourished and became a source of friction in the Balkans. This friction flared up with the assassination of the heir to the Habsburg throne by a Serb nationalist in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914. In the Inter-War period the first Yugoslav state

was established and the Bosnians came under Yugoslavia. Finally beginning with 1945 until the 1980s, the Bosniaks lived under Tito's Yugoslavia.[56]

Bosnia was by area the third largest republic of Tito's Yugoslavia, after Serbia and Croatia. Almost half of its population was Moslem/Bosniak, a third of Serb origin, 17 % Croats and 8% others with people identifying themselves as only 'Yugoslav'. The country resembled a microcosm of Yugoslavia with its pluralistic cultural outlook.[57] The difference from the general structure of Yugoslavia was that the people in Bosnia were not held together by any dictated authority. They have lived in harmony for centuries; until the emergence of ultra-nationalistic Serb ambitions.

Bosnia, initially, did not want to separate from Yugoslavia. It kept silent throughout the whole process that led to Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence. However, as soon as the two republics gained recognition, Bosnia suddenly realized that it was left in a smaller Yugoslavia to be dominated by a big Serbia. Under the newly established circumstances, remaining within Yugoslavia seemed impossible. Thus on 29 February and 1 March 1992 the Bosnian government held a referendum on independence as a precondition for diplomatic recognition. The referendum was boycotted by Bosnia's Serbs under the leadership of Radovan Karadzic.

More than seventy percent of the voters participated, and 99 percent of them voted in favor of independence and Bosnia was recognized as a sovereign state by the EU on 6 April 1992 and the US followed suit. The country became a member of the UN together with Slovenia and Croatia on 22 May of the same year.[58]

It seems that to achieve the aim of a 'Greater Serbia', the Serbs had drawn a military strategy in autumn 1991 which was to be carried out jointly by the JNA forces and the local Serb paramilitaries. By winter 1991-1992, the Serbs had set up artillery positions around major cities, including the capital, Sarajevo. These forces were backed up by additional JNA units which were being transformed into Bosnia from Croatia where cease-fire had been achieved in early 1992. All of these preparations culminated in the proclamation of a Bosnian Serb republic on 27 March 1992. On 30 March following a series of incidents in various Bosnian cities , the JNA's chief declared that his troops were ready to 'protect' the Serbs of Bosnia. This was the beginning of a terrible slaughter which would shock the world public.

Throughout the following month, large-scale massacres were carried out by the Serb paramilitary forces in close cooperation with the JNA in eastern

Bosnia. At this stage, the Croats in the south and north fought successfully in alliance with the Bosniaks. But this alliance was to be broken up soon when the Croatian President Tudjman set about taking large part of Bosnia for the Croats. From the end of summer 1992 onwards, the Croats under the leadership of Mate Boban and the supervision of Tudjman began 'cleansing' some areas in southern Bosnia from their former allies, Bosniaks. According to the Serb-Croat deal in 1992, Serbia would concede Croatian sovereignty in the Krajina region, while the Croats would let Eastern Slavonia go to Serbia. So the Serbs and Croats would share Bosnian territory.

When fighting broke out in Bosnia in April 1992, the Belgrade authority repeatedly stated that the JNA was only acting as a 'peace-keeping' force. But in reality, it was conducting a war of aggression against a neighboring state which had received worldwide diplomatic recognition. On 27 April, Serbia and Montenegro proclaimed the new State of Yugoslavia. In May, an announcement was made that the JNA soldiers of Bosnian Serb origin would be transferred with their weapons to the new Serb republic in Bosnia, while the rest would withdraw from the country. General Ratko Mladic, commander of the JNA in Knin during the war in Croatia in 1991, was appointed as the head of the Bosnian Serb army. In this way Milosevic aimed to give the impression to the outside world that he had nothing to do

with Bosnia, and that all was a conflict between the local Serbs and the Bosniaks. But this was certainly not the reality on the ground. Nevertheless, he achieved his aim and served as a saver for the Western politicians who were searching for an escape from military intervention. Now, they could name the aggression a 'civil war' and have their conscious free.[59]

4.2.Attitude of Germany and the International Community in the Bosnian War (1992)

The German deed of December 1991 caused immense criticism and Germany stepped back from its 'active' role in the Yugoslav crisis thereafter. In fact, the criticism put Germany into the position of a scapegoat since the war did not come to a permanent end. First and foremost, Germany showed much more reluctance and ignorance to the nations' right to self determination after December 1991. By this attitude, it, in some sense, approved the claims that the recognition of Croatia was more of a matter of social and historical ties than a matter of pure faith in the nations' right to self determination.[60]

In May 1992, the foreign minister Hans Dietrich Genscher, who managed to hold the chairmanship of the Liberal Democrats for some twenty years, was

replaced by Klaus Kinkel who then became the Foreign Minister. Klaus Kinkel, at the first opportunity, declared that Germany would strictly be bound to its allies, and that there would never again be a German unilateral diplomatic initiative.[61] Therefore beginning with 1992, "Bonn committed itself fully to supporting international initiatives, whether with other countries, such as the US and France, or through international bodies like the UN, the EU, ICFY and significantly in terms of Germany's diplomatic evolution, the Contact Group."[62] German foreign policy priority now became the re-harmonization of its position in the EC and strengthening the common approach.

By the end of May, Bosnia had been recognized both by the EU and the US and admitted to the UN. However, all of these were not enough to stop Serb atrocities; the war was continuing with all its brutality resulting in the fleeing of thousands of Bosnians from their homes. The ones that remained home were subjected to one of the most brutal genocide in European history.[63] Despite all, the world set back and watched. The only significant initiative of the international community came in May with the UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution which imposed a comprehensive trade embargo on Serbia and Montenegro and froze all overseas financial assets of Yugoslavia. This was the first time that the West imposed seemingly serious

economic and military sanctions on the Serbs, believing that it would stop the Serb aggression.[64]

When the war began in April, Bosnia was deprived because of the arms embargo imposed by the UN Security Council on all territories of the former Yugoslavia.

> "Chapter VII of the UN Charter granted all member states the 'inherent right' to individual and collective self-defense. This right was not inalienable, as many critics of international policy frequently argued with reference to Bosnia. It was a right subject to the greater authority of the UN Security Council: nothing could impair the right to self-defense 'until the Security Council has taken an appropriate decision.'"[65]

The arms embargo issue had put the international community to shame as the war went on. It was a contradiction within itself. It was imposed on former Yugoslavia and the UN, by recognizing Bosnia as a sovereign state in May 1992, agreed that it was a separate entity from Yugoslavia. However, the country was still treated as if nothing had changed and this encouraged the Serbs into more ethnic cleansing. Moreover, the UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali ruled out the use of UN forces (UNPROFOR) that were set up in Bosnia for the peacekeeping operation of Croatia. By May 16, most of the UNPROFOR situated in Sarajevo was

withdrawn. The EU followed suit and withdrew its monitors by accepting that nothing could be accomplished under the existing circumstances.

It was only at the end of June that the UNPROFOR came back to Sarajevo airport, and even then only to control and supervise the delivery of humanitarian aid. But this duty could not be practiced properly; the UNPROFOR soldiers were corrosive in discipline and vulnerable to the permission of the Serb paramilitary in the delivery of the aid.[66]

While the war was going on, German Foreign Minister Kinkel attended two conferences to discuss the Yugoslav issue in the summer of 1992. The first was the CSCE conference in Helsinki held in the first week of July in which he criticized the organization as being a 'dead bird'[67] unable to reach any decisions. Indeed, there was much debate in the conference, but no compromise. In the end of August, another conference was held in London, again to discuss the war in former Yugoslavia. All parties to the conflict were present in London; the EU foreign ministers, the members of UNSC, some members of the CSCE, as well as the representatives from all the former republics of Yugoslavia. The Serbs were 'invited to behave human'. The Bosnian foreign minister Haris Silajdzic said that it was a shame for Europe of not being able to stop the war, and proposed that the international

community should at least lift the arms embargo on Bosnia and recognize the right of the country to self defense. He was, naturally, skeptical the Serbs and stated that 'one should be either dumb or too naive to trust an aggressor that has broken the cease-fire for dozens of times would this time hold on to its promise and behave properly'. One other skeptic of the conference was the German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel. He phrased the conference as the last chance to solve the conflict by political means. The biggest success of London for Kinkel was the stricter supervision of the UN on the imposition of the embargo on Serbia and Montenegro. The conference was the first step of UN-EU cooperation, where the co-chairmen of the two institutions, Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, decided to put forth a joint plan for a political solution in Yugoslavia. The conference was closed with the recognition of Bosnia's territorial integrity and identification of Serbia and Montenegro as aggressors in the conflict. It further called upon the introduction of UN peacekeeping forces into Bosnia in order to maintain a cease-fire in the area.

The Geneva Peace Conference the following month was tasked to find mechanisms to implement the principles laid down in London. However, instead of honoring the recognition of Bosnian territorial integrity of the London Conference, the co-chairmen David Owen and Cyrus Vance

introduced the notion of "three warring factions". This notion placed the Izzetbegovic government on the same level as with the Croat and Serb 'insurgents', which, in turn, laid the basis for negotiating the partition of Bosnia. This was obviously a big reward to the Serb aggression. From there on, the UN and the EU mediators, along with the Western media, began to treat the Bosnian government as only representing the Muslims, although by February 1993 the Bosnian cabinet included six Serbs and five Croats in addition to nine Muslims.[68]

Taking Geneva as a basis, Vance and Owen began to mediate between the "warring factions". This attempt soon proved to be impossible since the parties were unable to agree on any fundamental principle. The Bosnian President Izzetbegovic insisted on the territorial integrity of his state; the Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic and Serbian President Milosevic proclaimed that any area inhabited by Serbs -even if they are a minority in the area- had the right to join with the larger Serbian state being created. Thus, by October 1992, no compromise could be reached between the so-called 'warring parties', and Vance and Owen decided to conclude a peace plan without taking into consideration the demands of the warring sides.

By the summer of 1992, there started a debate in Germany about the military cooperation of the country in regard to Yugoslavia. However, any military activity outside the country was an issue of a very sensitive nature. The issue lacked a constitutional as well as public support at home. Nevertheless, in August 1992 Germany began contributing to the Adriatic naval operations as part of NATO – WEU joint sanctions monitoring.[69] But this was probably all Germany was prepared to do.

Instead, the year 1992 revealed that Germany had no intention of formulating a policy on Bosnia independent from its partners, nor was it prepared to lead the EU into action. Instead, it was acting in full harmony with the rest of the EU member states, and especially with France. Both France and Germany made much effort to show a picture of one to the outside world, even if they were not in full agreement. This was due to their will to promote the political union of the EU, and Bosnia soon became just part of a practice for this end.[70]

4.3. The Situation on the Ground in Bosnia in 1993

The year 1993 began with the peace talks in Geneva on the basis of the plan put forth by Vance and Owen.

> "The Vance-Owen Plan in fact made a dramatic break with the past diplomatic practice and in one swoop annulled a key principle of international law that had been agreed upon in the interests of fostering stability in political transitions. Known as uti possidetis, ita possidetis (you may keep what you had before), the principle established that when colonial possessions became independent or when existing states broke up, internal administrative borders should be treated as legitimate... With the Vance-Owen Plan, the EC began its slide away from uti possidetis and opened the door to partial recognition of conquests."[71]

The plan proposed to divide Bosnia into ten self-governing provinces. Although, on paper, there was an emphasis on the preservation of a unified Bosnian state, the central government was granted almost no authority to hold the country together. There was no distinct clause that would stop the Bosnian Croats and the Serbs from joining Croatia and Serbia proper. The plan gave about half of the Bosnian territories to the Serb control which was much more than the pre-war Serb population ratio, but less than the Serb forces held in 1993. Freedom of movement was to be assured and the UN troops would patrol 'corridors' linking the separate areas to each other. The Croats accepted the plan on stage, since it responded to the Croat

aspirations. The plan offered the Muslims about thirty percent of the total territory, which was disproportionate to the pre-war number of the Muslim inhabitants of Bosnia.

The Bosnian President Izzetbegovic first resisted. But under persistent Western pressure, he grudgingly accepted it, in the hope that war would come to an end. The Bosnian Serbs, on the other hand, rejected the plan on 12 January 1993. They were, indeed, encouraged in their aggressiveness by the conditions of the plan set forth and by the lack of will of the international community to impose credible sanctions. As the negotiations were continuing, they captured eastern Bosnia (Gradacac, Gorazde, Orasje, lastly Srebrenica) which was proposed in the plan to be under Muslim control.[72]

Meanwhile tension between the Croats and Muslims broke out in open warfare. The Vance-Owen Plan was the real cause for the fighting between the two former allies. The Croats realized that what the Plan set forth was to reward the territory won on the battlefield, so more victories, by any means, might result in more territorial gain on the table.[73] The fighting changed direction of the alignment to such an extent that Croats began cooperating with the Serbs against the Muslims.

The US that held distant to the conflict till then stepped in with a declaration of 'Six Points'. In February 1993, the US government explained its readiness to engage stronger in the war in Bosnia with the aim of achieving peace on the basis of the Plan set forth. In February 1993, Washington hosted the foreign ministers of Britain, Russia, Spain and France and proposed to guarantee six 'safe havens' to the Bosnian Muslims. At the beginning of March the United States began the air-drop operation to help sustain enclaves in eastern Bosnia, which could not be reached by land convoys. By the end of March Germany began to take part in US air-drop operation.

By then it became clear, however, that no resolution or new initiative short of using effective force was likely to deter the Serbs, who continued to reject any terms of negotiation. Upon the continuos rejection of the Vance – Owen plan by the Serbs, the American foreign minister Warren Christopher unveiled a 'lift and strike' plan to his European colleagues during his famous trip to Europe in May 1993. The US by then was convinced that the Serbs could only be pushed to the negotiation table through the use of force. The idea of 'lift' aimed to exempt the Muslims from the arms embargo and enable them to defend themselves on even terms. This would in turn result in a stalemate in the battlefield that would induce the Serbs to negotiate with

the Muslims seriously. The other concept, the 'strike', referred to the threat of the use of air power against the Serbs, if any violation of any UN resolution came about.

The US made a proposal to the UN Security Council in June 1993 in order to lift the arms embargo in favor of the Bosnian government. However, the proposal could not get sufficient support from the European powers, except for Germany which hoped that the plan would bring a rush and clear-cut solution to the conflict. Germany in the issue of lifting the embargo stood next to the US, facing its European partners Britain and France. Britain and France were opposing the lift under the thesis that a lift on arms embargo would prolong the fighting. The European argument was that more arms might lead to a larger war possibly by drawing the Yugoslav army, which by then had become the army of Serbia proper, into the conflict, and thereby expand it, engulfing Serbia and then Croatia into this expanded war. Under these circumstances, the British and French forces on the ground in former Yugoslavia might be exposed to a considerable danger and might needed to be evacuated beforehand. This would eventually cut off any further deliveries of humanitarian aid. If the Western forces were not be evacuated. Britain and France feared that the air strikes against the Serbian targets might lead the Serbs to retaliate against Western forces on the ground or

turn these forces into hostages. Thus, France and Britain brandished their right to veto on the issue also when the UN General Assembly has passed a resolution in December the same year calling for the lift of the arms embargo against the Bosnian government. Eventually, the US had to put the plan aside for a year and a half, and capitulate to the European initiatives.[74]

Instead, palliatives were put into execution. For instance, in March 1993 the UNSC authorized the use of force to implement the "no-fly" ban in Resolution 816. On 12 April the Operation Deny Flight of NATO AWACS began to implement this resolution. Several NATO member countries who sent war planes were authorized to use force in case of violation of the no-fly zone. In addition, by the UNSC resolution 824 'safe areas' were created in Bosnia in April and May 1993.[75]

In May 1993, UN mediator Cyrus Vance who became wary of the prospects following the rejection of the Vance-Owen plan was replaced by Thorvald Stoltenberg. Based on the new reality of the Serb – Croat coalition, the new pair revised the previous plan and presented it to the warring parties on 20 August 1993. The Owen–Stoltenberg plan offered 52 percent of the territories to the Bosnian Serbs, 30 percent to the Muslims, and 18 percent to the Croats.[76] "Western mediators at first expressed "optimism" at the

prospects for Bosnian government acceptance of what was, in effect, a Serb-Croat plan, and described its ultimate rejection as "unexpected".[77] They were hoping that the Bosnian government would agree on any plan put forth in order to stop the war. But the Muslim dominant Bosnian parliament of the end of September announced that they would only agree on the plan if the forcibly annexed territories of Bosnia were returned back to the Republic.

But the policy of appeasement had reached such a point at Western capitals that France and Germany in November 1993 began advocating lifting of the economic sanctions imposed on Serbia in return for Serbia conceding some additional territory to the 'Muslims' at the negotiation table.[78] This initiative came to no avail since the Serbs were managing to consume their needs 'efficiently' even under the economic embargo.

The proposal was a consequence of the EU-Action plan which authorized a French-German initiative for the war in Yugoslavia. The two tried to mediate with the parties on a loose three-nation confederation which in the end also became a document representing the helplessness of the West. The only positive impact of the initiative was that it brought the two leading countries of the EU again to a more cooperative position. After the

reunification and the Germany's earlier recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. France felt the need to counter-balance German power and contain Germany. Throughout 1992 and 1993, France developed a reactionary attitude towards German proposals which brought it closer to the British stance. However, for its own national interests, which were based on the progress of the EU, Germany could not be left aside. The two countries had now to show political compromise for the sake of the Union.

4.4. The Debate on German Military Cooperation

As mentioned earlier, systematic level change in European political arena, together with the reunification of Germany had altered the foreign policy parameters of Germany. The era of post-1990 made Germany a more equal partner of the West, as well as a more responsible one. One of the major responsibilities aroused by Germany's new role in the international arena was related to its military cooperation. The issue of German military cooperation had been a sensitive one since the end of the Second World War. The German philosophy in respect to military interventions separated it clearly from its allies. During the Cold War, German participation in combat operations or in actual warfare was only conceivable within the NATO framework which was taken by Germany basically as the means to

defend its own territory in case of a Soviet threat. The use of military force was also only thinkable for the defense of a NATO ally, since an attack on an ally would inevitably bring the war to Germany anyhow. Thus military force for Germany did not have a tradition of use to further its political aims. As the European security system altered in the beginning of the 1990s, Germany lacked an immediate change in its military tradition.[79]

The Gulf War crisis of 1990 was an indication to this absence. Germany in the Gulf War was obliged to provide for its allies on every count, such as logistic and financial support, except for sending combat forces to the region. The country was put under intense pressure by its allies to send troops but to no avail. German troops could only be deployed for defensive purposes to the Turkish soil, which was an ally of NATO. The issue, indeed was more than a philosophical reluctance. It was the juristic and public constrains at home that bound the hands of the Kohl government to take an active role in the war in the Gulf. True, Kohl did not foresee any national interest for Germany in sending combat troops to the region. But even if he had, would not have been easy to do so because the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany did prohibit and still does the state from using the Bundeswehr anywhere outside the NATO defense area.[80]

On the issue of use of force, the domestic parameters of German politics seemed to be supporting each other. The public had developed a reluctance on the use of force during the past four decades; the Constitution was permitting the use of force only in case of self-defense, thereby putting the expectations of the German people on a legitimate basis. However, the changed international community was expecting more German participation in the issue of military cooperation in addition to the other diplomatic initiatives. The West did not want to tolerate the German attitude which tried to further its say in every diplomatic arena except any military responsibility. Thus the government at first faced a dilemma between the domestic and the international expectations.[81]

The head of government, Kohl and Kinkel, wanted to have a judicial basis on all their policy implementations. The article of the Basic Law prohibiting German use of force out of NATO and out of allied territories needed to be amended. The use of force was mentioned in two articles of German Basic Law; one was the article 87 paragraph 1 and 2 which explicitly states that the use of armed forces were only possible in case of self-defense. The second statement on the use of armed forces was in article 24 paragraph 2 which empowers the Federal Republic to participate in systems of collective security.

> "A majority of constitutional lawyers, supported by the CDU/CSU, read this as authorizing German membership of NATO, and as a blank cheque for participation in activities taken in accordance with the United Nations Charter, be it peace-keeping or enforcement actions under Chapter VII. The German government expressed no reservation on this matter when Germany acceded to the UN, nor did Parliament on the occasion of the ratification of this accession... Since the United Nations, under Chapter VII, acts as a system of collective security, it fits the conditions of Art.24, and participation is fully permitted."[82]

Therefore, the conservatives, at first stage believed that a change in the constitution was unnecessary. However, there was a counter argument backed by the FDP wing of the government, as well as the leading opposition party SPD which stated that the NATO participation could not be included into the case of 'collective security', but it should rather be included into collective defense, and this was not mentioned in Art.24 at all. Initially, both sides agreed that the Constitution lacked serving the existing circumstances and required a change.[83] But as time went on debates on the substance of the amendment resulted in deadlock leading the conservatives to become inclined to assume a position that the Basic Law did in fact permit all they wanted. Upon this stance, the government by 1992, preferred to ignore the opposition and the fact that the argument in the Basic Law was unclear and acted by its own decision.

Indeed, the issue of military cooperation was so complex that even the government members could not reach a compromise in 1992. The defense minister Volker Ruehe was ambitious on sending the Bundesmarine as soon as possible to the Coast of Adriatic and back it up by the German warships later on if necessary.[84] Chancellor Kohl and foreign minister Kinkel, on the other hand, seemed more concerned about the judicial basis of their decisions. Actually Kinkel was obliged to overcome the constitutional obstacles in order to persuade his own party members, the FDP parliamentarians. He had to propose an amendment that clarified the use of military only within the UN and Blue Helmets context, so that it would also gain acceptance by the Social Democrats. A draft was written to Karlsruhe, the place that identified the German Constitutional Court.[85] However, without waiting for the ratification of the Court, in mid-July 1992, the government sent Bundesmarine forces to the coast of Adriatic. The naval force was composed of one destroyer and three airplanes. The aim of the naval force was to contribute to the monitoring of the embargo imposed on Yugoslavia.[86]

This initiative of the government was enough to raise further questions on German military cooperation. Every one was asking and discussing to what extend the German government could be authorized to lead the German

armed forces. In late 1992, the German politicians as well as the head of military personnel were faced with the definition of morality. On the one hand, the pictures of the brutal and bloody war in Bosnia was continuing with the cries of children and raped women; and the international community looked helpless in its sanctions and attempts on the other. Every day the issue of military intervention to stop the war was pronounced by one or the other, and then again left aside, since no one in the West did in fact want to take the burden of this action. As in all the other European capitals, also in Bonn, sorrow was felt for the civilians' pain but the use of armed forces, especially Bundeswehr was even regarded as more immoral than the ongoing war.[87]

The slightly existing consensus in the German parliament in keeping the Bundeswehr out of Bosnia had all disappeared in April 1993, when the German government decided to contribute to NATO AWACS airborne monitoring and control flights. In August 1990 Chancellor Kohl and the SPD chef Hans-Jochen Vogel agreed that the Bundeswehr would not take action outside the areas stated in the Basic Law. This included that Bundeswehr would not send soldiers outside the NATO defense area, and in case of cooperation within the UN, the Basic Law would be amended under a compromise of the political parties. Since this agreement could not be

continued, and that the government acted on its own, the SPD used the opportunity to join the case before the Constitutional Court. On 8 April 1993, the German Constitutional Court outlawed the German contribution to the Operation Deny Flight.[88]

The involvement in the NATO AWACS airborne monitoring and control flights was highly criticized at home for having no legitimate basis. On the other hand, it was regarded as a break-through in German foreign policy traditions based on the avoidance of war and armed forces.[89]

CHAPTER V

MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WAR IN BOSNIA 1994-1995 AND GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

5.1. Continuation of the war in Bosnia in 1994 and the International Initiatives

At the beginning of 1994, the conditions in Bosnia did not offer much ground for optimism. The uncertainty was continuing and negotiations were resulting in deadlocks. Indeed the scope of the war was described to be more negative than a year before with the additional Croat–Muslim fighting at its peak. The Croatian President Tudjman was threatening to intervene on behalf of the Bosnian Croat forces, since towards the end of 1993, the fighting seemed to turn to a Muslim upper hand against the Croats. But military intervention could be very expensive for Croatia, since it was threatened with sanctions by the West in case of intervention. On 10 January 1994, the Croatian and Bosnian presidents met in Bonn for a compromise on the division of Bosnia, however, no conclusion could be reached. The fighting continued during the talks.[90]

In regard to Serbia, President Milosevic had emerged from the December 1993 general elections as the leading figure, but his room for maneuver was narrowing. Mass poverty and economic collapse was almost total; the country was faced with hyper-inflation –a million percent per month in the beginning of 1994- and the opposition against Milosevic was becoming more reactionary. Moreover, his influence on the Bosnian Serb leadership was weakening: he was not able to persuade them on territorial concessions as required by the West as a prelude to a comprehensive peace.

Meanwhile the UN peacekeeping forces had begun complaining about their helplessness; lacking military efficiency, they were being insulted and threatened and even taken as hostage by the Serb paramilitaries. Under these circumstances, the West began repeatedly to mention NATO air strikes to stop the Serb aggression.

> "The general view was that the western Alliance was at a turning point: it would either withdraw the UN peacekeeping force from the region latest by the beginning of the following year and leave the warring parties to their own faith, or it would begin implementing the threat that it gave to the Serbian side several times." [91]

However, the indecisiveness of the West continued, until the mortar attack of February 1994 on a market place in Sarajevo which resulted in the killing

of sixty-eight civilians and wounding 197 others. The horrible scenes of the attack caused more attention than expected in the international media and created the feeling that something must be done as soon as possible. This in return caused some mobilization in the diplomatic initiatives. The UN military and civilian leaders began negotiating for a cease fire for Sarajevo. NATO issued an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs to end the siege of Sarajevo. At the end of February, due to the ongoing Serb aggression and under pressure from the West, the Croats and the Muslims signed a 'Framework Agreement' that established a federation within Bosnia between the Croats and the Muslims. At the four days of talks in Washington, the Croats were persuaded on territorial concessions to the Muslims. The Croat change of attitude and accepting concession could be based on Tudjman's will to be the 'good boy' in the eyes of the West in particular of Germany, so that the political and economic support from the West would continue.[92] The federation foresaw 51 percent of the Bosnian territories, of which 34 percent would be under Muslim and 17 percent under Croat control.[93] Interestingly, Russia was involved in the negotiations of the West and was accused by the Serbs of letting them down.[94] On 10 and 11 April 1994, the first of the NATO air strikes was practiced on the Serb forces in Gorazde, which initially was designated as one of the safe areas of the UN. [95]

From these air strikes towards the end of April, a new diplomatic initiative, the Contact Group, emerged for the implementation of an overall peace process in Bosnia. "The Contact Group represented the first point in the international involvement in the Yugoslav conflict where the major players, despite their divergent perspectives and preferences, attempted to act decisively with an agreed political objective and as one."[96] It was led by the US in cooperation with representatives of France, Russia, UK and Germany. The latter's involvement was important due to its major position in the EU, as well as due to its potential influence over Croatia. In the summer of 1994 the parties were offered a Federation within the 51 percent of the Bosnian territories of which 34 percent would go to the Muslims and 17 percent to the Croats. The Serbs were left with the remaining 49 percent.

In return for accepting the Plan, the Serbs were promised the lifting of the economic embargo. If they would not accept the Plan, the West threatened to lift the arms embargo on the Muslims. The Serbs declared the Plan to be dissatisfactory, since the offered portion was much less than what they held at the time, -72 percent- even though the offer was much more than the proportion of the Serb population in Bosnia of 1990. The Bosnian Serb

leader Karadzic demanded more territorial concession for the 'Lebensraum of the Serb nation' and an opening to the Adriatic.[97]

Upon the Serb refusal, the US restated the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia and tighten the sanctions against the Serbs. By this, however, the US aimed to create a balance between Serb and Muslim forces. The lift of the arms embargo issue was highly opposed by the Contact Group members, Russia, France and the UK. For London and Paris, lifting of the embargo should be the last thing to have in mind. The two European states further threatened that they would withdraw their Blue Helmets if such a decision was to be accepted at this point. Despite its European counterparts, Germany in principle was supporting the US point of view. But alone Germany's and US' will was not enough within the Contact Group. Nevertheless, the Clinton administration insisted on the lift and declared in August that it had put the deadline for the Serbs to the end of October. The US stated that the delivery of arms to Bosnia would begin in November even if the international community did not agree.[98]

In the meantime, starting with summer 1994, the consensus between the Serbian President Milosevic and the Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic began to break down. A struggle for power had started. The Serbian President seemed

more ready to accept negotiations than Karadzic. Milosevic had his own reasons for doing so; he was exhausted from the embargo as well as the financial burden caused by the war. Therefore, Karadzic's rejection of the Plan of the Contact Group was not welcomed and supported by Milosevic.[99] Indeed, in October 1994, the Serbian President described the war in Bosnia as an unnecessary adventure and called on the Bosnian Serbs to end the fighting. "They have reached their objective," he said in Belgrade and that "further fighting would be a territorial aggression towards others."[100]

By the end of 1994, the United States and its allies could not reach a compromise on the lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia and, as it declared previously, the US in November 1994, withdrew its two war ships from the Adriatic which were situated for the enforcement of the arms embargo. According to some press reports, the US even took a further step and began arming the Croats and the Muslims.[101] The strongest opposition to the US initiative came from Britain and France. The rest of the NATO forces continued to practice the embargo in the Adriatic with the remaining sixteen ships.

"De facto little has altered in the Blockade, which de facto was no more in existence since the troops of the Bosnian government were already receiving

war materials by some means."[102] The embargo in fact had ceased to exist a long time ago. The Serbs received weapons from the Russians for most of the war period. Now that the West seemed reluctant and ignorant on the issue, countries supporting the Croats and the Muslims had also started military aid. The Islamic states, 'fed up with the West's pusillanimity and lack of resolve, stepped up arms aid to the Croat-Muslim alliance.'[103]

Upon these developments, beginning in Autumn 1994, the Croat-Muslim front started to show more strength on the battlefield. The Bosnian government forces had recaptured a considerable portion of territory to the east and southeast of Bihac by the end October. They even managed to crash a Serbian battalion in battle around Sarajevo. Oddly enough, at this point the UN troops intervened and expelled the Bosnian troops. The same day, UN special envoy Yasushi Akashi issued a protest to Izzetbegovic, and threatened the Bosnian government with serious counter-measures in the event of a recurrence.[104]

By December, the West's disagreement seemed like a mass. France and Britain wanted to pull their troops out of Bosnia in reaction to the US initiative. Their withdrawal would mean the termination of the UN mission in Bosnia, since the French and British forces made up a third of the total

UNPROFOR units in the region. The US acknowledged that in case of a UN withdrawal from the region, the US would lead NATO into a military intervention.[105] The Russian foreign minister Kozyrev at this stage announced that Russia might preserve its military presence in the region even after the termination of the UNPROFOR mandate.[106] The Serbs were worried about the removal of the UN forces, "since UNPROFOR had been allowing Bosnian Serb forces to skim off nearly 50 percent of all food brought in for 'humanitarian' purposes and nearly 40 percent of all fuel."[107] With the possibility of NATO intervention in Bosnia, the eyes turned on German military contribution within the NATO context.

5.2. Towards the Decision for German Troops Deployment on the Ground

German contribution was first placed on the agenda of NATO and UN before November 1994. But, upon the request of the German government, the issue was left aside by the US and UN until the general elections of the

Federal Republic were over. Right after the elections, pressure on Germany for further military aid in the war in Bosnia increased.

In fact, as early as August 1994, the German Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe gave acceptance to the Bundeswehr contribution within the UN peacekeeping forces which meant that Germany could from then on send its Blue Helmet soldiers around the world where the UN was serving for 'collective security'. With this decision, Karlsruhe was at last legitimizing the position of German naval forces in the Adriatic. The declaration of the Court was received triumphantly among the cabinet members, whereas the public debate and the criticism of the opposition was still continuing. Foreign Minister Kinkel stated that the 'brakes which hindered their actions were now over.' However, the Federal government was still not happy. The judges of Karlsruhe had written down some prerequisites even if the clarity of the sentences required further interpretation:

> "The use of German troops is only possible in case of UN Security Council Resolution; the use of force requires 'pre-constitutive approval of the Bundestag'. The Bundeswehr is not 'on its own as the might-potential to practice the executive, but is responsible to the democratic, parliamentary and judicial order of the state'. 'The structure and density of the contribution' must be resolved under a unique law. 'In case of a Bundestag announcement, the Bundeswehr is obliged to end its mission'."[108]

The decision of the Constitutional Court was indeed complex and exposed to question marks. German military contribution was allowed under a 'system of collective security'. Whether this statement referred only to the UN contribution or whether it also included the actions within the WEU and NATO context was vague. The opposition, SPD, argued that the decision of Karlsruhe foresaw only the UN initiative. The coalition government, on the other hand, was convinced that the law was covering all, including Bundeswehr contribution also within NATO.[109]

Although the historical perceptions on Germany had seemingly evaporated among its allies, the Federal Republic still showed high sensitivity on the issue. The public opinion and the opposition did not seem to be comfortable with the extensions of the use of Bundeswehr.[110]

> "How much material and how many soldiers should the Bundeswehr make ready so that both the Allies would be satisfied, and the image be avoided that the Germans enter the War in the Balkans with 'Hurra'?" [111]

The government was at home defending the extension of the use of armed forces, whereas outside, towards its partners it continued to show reluctance, saying that the Constitutional Court did not allow and that it would not be proper for Germany to take front against Serbs due to its historical

perceptions.[112] These justifications were all taken by the allies as Germany's attempts to escape from responsibility.[113]

In November 1994, the US demanded German military contribution in Bosnia within the NATO context. The Bundeswehr Tornado was to be positioned in Bosnia. Moreover, German soldiers would help on the ground in case of UN withdrawal from the region. The Federal government found itself between a dilemma; on one side wanting to keep the promise given to the partners that after the legal obstacles Germany would act in a more responsible manner, on the other side faced with the fears of the historical perceptions at home. In the beginning of December the German government declared that further German contribution to NATO was unthinkable. This statement softened throughout the month.[114] Towards the end of the same month the government decided to send the German Tornados to Bosnia under NATO command. This shift in decision within a very short period of time had several reasons.[115]

The government began to alter its announcements in the second half of December. Foreign Minister Kinkel and Defense Minister Ruehe began saying that if Germany was obliged to take responsibility to end the war, it should do so. Since what made credit in the domestic politics was issues of

humanitarian concern, this issue was also represented as a case serving humanitarian ends, namely, the termination of the suffering of the Muslims in Bosnia. Moreover, taking further responsibility could have increased the German credit in international politics; the government argued that it might return to Germany in the form of more say in the UN or the Security Council. Thus towards the end of the month, Kohl said that they could not let their friends down, and declared that Germany would take part with its soldiers on the ground.[116] The decision received a lot of criticism from the major opposition party, SPD, that Germany should not contribute to NATO's intention to become world police. The opposition, indeed, continued its critical point of view on the Atlantic Pact. On the details of the topic, the opposition and the government could not get to a compromise.[117] It was further claimed that nothing could be improved with the additional German contribution to the region. Kohl was accused of being interested only in his image in the eyes of his partners and thereby ignoring the costs of the action.[118]

The shift in stand in regard to military contribution was indeed a revolutionary one for Germany. The German government perceived the issue as another step for Germany becoming a normal and an equal state that attempts to take share in the responsibility of international conflicts next to

its partners The government partners, Kohl and Kinkel, were convinced that Germany's change of attitude was a consequence of the systemic-level change in Europe, and that it was the duty of a stronger Germany to cope with the changes. The Social Democrats in the opposition, however, seemed to be more concerned with the images that might arise due to Germany's expansion of the use of military force. They interpreted the decisions taken on Bundeswehr contribution as the first signs for the revival of the history.[119] Nevertheless, it was a major step representing the transition of German foreign policy tradition in the post-Cold War era.

5.3. Major Developments of 1995 and German Troops on the Ground

The year 1995 started with a four month cease-fire which came about through the efforts of the former US president Jimmy Carter. Within these four months the Contact Group hoped to further the negotiations between the parties. The cease-fire was established between the Muslim-led government and the Bosnian Serbs, but the Serbs of Krajina did not get involved in this truce and continued their fighting in the northwest Bihac enclave. The Contact Group in February 1995 put together an outline agreement on a plan that foresaw a further easing of sanctions on Serbia in return for Serbian recognition of Bosnia and Croatia. The Plan proposed that

Milosevic would cease to give military aid to the Bosnian or the Croatian Serbs. In case he would continue or restart military aid, sanctions would be reimposed on Serbia. Although being deprived heavily from the economic sanctions, the offer of the Contact Group was a hard deal for Milosevic. At the time, about 70 percent of Bosnia and close to a third of Croatia was held by the Serb forces. Recognition of Bosnia and Croatia would mean to deny this reality which he himself had created and supported.

In the beginning of March, Croatia formed a military alliance with the Muslim-Croat front of Bosnia which further strengthened the already recovered Muslim-Croat forces. The Croat-Muslim Accord was permitting Croatia to get officially involved in the fighting in Bosnia, particularly in those areas adjacent to the Croatian border such as the north-west Bihac territories. The support from Croatia added muscle to the anti-Serb front which resulted in a stronger position for the Federation both on the battlefield as well as on the negotiation table.

By May the war had restarted with an escalated swing in which Tudjman claimed to conquer back all territories occupied by the Serbs. To this aim, the Croat forces first of all managed to recapture Western Slavonia. Meanwhile Serbian attacks on Sarajevo were continuing. Karadzic

threatened to harden its attacks by taking the Blue Helmets as hostage and by attacking the safe areas in case of NATO air strikes against the Serbs.[120]

Ignoring the threat of the Bosnian Serb leader, by mid-May NATO restarted its air strikes. After bombing an ammunition depot near the Serb headquarters of Pale, the Bosnian Serbs took 350 UN peacekeepers as hostage. France and Britain began pressing Milosevic to help release the hostages but to no avail. They, therefore, decided to send in rapid reaction forces to support the UN troops. Initially the US wanted to send in the rapid reaction forces under the command of NATO. Due to the opposition of the European partners, France and Britain, this proposal had been let aside. However, the US continued with its plan on NATO action. The West was still not acting in harmony on a strategy in Bosnia.[121]

Both sending of supplementary UN forces and the intervention of NATO required the cooperation of the Bundeswehr. While the allies were busy with getting to a compromise on the operation in Bosnia, the Germans were concerned at home with their own troublesome issue, the amount and form of the military support that the Federal government was permitted to give to its partners. The Germans put forth the bureaucratic obstacles and obligations for sending the Bundeswehr in the aim of delaying the

unavoidable final. According to the new arrangement of the Constitutional Court, Kohl and his coalition partners needed to take the approval of the Parliament for each single cooperation of the Bundeswehr outside the NATO defense area. Besides, the approval of the Parliament in case of contribution of the Bundeswehr within NATO but outside the NATO defense area (since the Constitutional amendment only foresaw a case of 'collective security' which intends to refer to the UN, but leave open NATO), should also be backed up by the Constitution in Karlsruhe.[122] Nevertheless, the German government was ready to support a US –NATO-initiative.[123]

However, Bonn found itself in its traditional dilemma of trying to keep in solidarity both with its European partners as well as with the US. The European partners, France and Britain, were not supporting a NATO intervention which would be led by the US. As the German Defense Minister Ruehe and Foreign Minister Kinkel were waiting ready for the command to deploy the Bundeswehr Tornados to Bosnia, the dispute at home was still not resolved. The German Tornado aircraft, which Brussels demanded from Germany, was specialized for air-defense suppression cases. The Secretary General of SPD, Rudolf Scharping opposed the contribution of German Tornados in Bosnia and claimed that the deployment of any

German military equipment to the region would only further escalate the situation on the ground. The leader of the second opposition party –the Greens- in the Parliament, Joschka Fischer was also on the same line with the SPD. Fischer argued that the government was by this initiative self-straitening its foreign policy dimensions. Yet, Defense Minister Ruehe's argument that the contribution would enhance the solidarity between Germany and its partners took the support of 45 Social Democrats and four Greens in addition to the Christian Democrat and Free Democrat parliamentarians.[124] Thus, by June 1995, Germany began to take part in the NATO air strike operation with its Tornado aircraft, equipped specifically for air defense suppression. "Kohl and Kinkel, step by step, were making the unified Germans get used to the concept of worldwide military intervention."[125]

In July, the Serbs captured the two safe areas in eastern Bosnia, Srebrenica and Zepa. A third safe area, Gorazde, was exposed to a Serb onslaught. The Croats, in the meantime, had captured Krajina and the Dalmatian coast, which was popular with its tourist industry. The Krajina capture became in return a justification for Serbs for further attacks in Bosnia, but they felt weaker now both mentally and materially. Materially weak, because the Muslim-Croat alliance had become on to equivalent terms with the Serbs.

since the alliance did receive military aid from several countries. Mentally weak, because all the legends on Serbs' invincibility had come to an end. In addition to this, the Bosnian Serb leaders Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic had been indicted by the UN War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague.

The capture of the safe areas ceased the remaining patience in the international community, especially in regard to the US. The already crippled UN credibility was all destroyed.[126] In these newly created circumstances, the US seemed more ready to intervene in Bosnia even if it did not take the support of its European partners. After all the threats and ultimatums issued to the Serbs, if an operation ending the war could not take place, the US credibility and deterrence in the international arena might well be annulled. Moreover, Clinton was eager to end the war before the coming general elections.[127]

In response to the 28 August Serb mortar attack on Sarajevo which killed about 40 civilians and wounded more than eighty others, on 30 August NATO allies embarked on a concerted air campaign against Serb forces. The bombing became a decisive event in bringing the Serbs, who were already exhausted by Croat-Muslims groups, on to the negotiation table. While the bombing was going on, the US sent Richard Holbrooke as its special envoy

to the region. Holbrooke was tasked with the coordination of the peace efforts and negotiating the details of a comprehensive settlement.[128] Although the Russians and even some European states openly complained about the duration of the NATO bombing, the US continued with the operation and Germany remained loyal to the air strikes.

5.4. Coming to the Terms of Peace in Dayton and the German Role within the Contact Group

As early as September, the intense NATO bombing gave its feedback and the Serbs expressed their readiness to accept the peace plan proposed by the West. The first meeting took place on September 8th in Geneva in the presence of the foreign ministers of the three countries, Serbia, Bosnia, and Croatia. The second meeting took place at the end of the same month, on September 26th in New York. Two agreements came out from the two meetings. According to these two accords, a single Bosnian state was to be established that would consist of two entities, the Serbian Republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia. Territorial proposal was left for adjustment by mutual agreement. Both entities had the right to establish special relationships with the neighbors, consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia. In regard to the initial Croat and Serb

republics, Croatian-Bosnian relations were not put under limitation unless it jeopardized Bosnia's border, whereas the Serbs could have only a special link to Serbia.[129] There was an undeniable US diplomatic initiative in coming to the terms of peace in Bosnia. Initially, it was the NATO bombing and the shuttle diplomacy of Holbrooke that changed the scope of the events. Another consequence of Richard Holbrooke's diplomacy was the lift of the siege on Sarajevo by October in return for a recommendation to NATO to suspend the bombing.

In November the final peace talks began in Dayton, Ohio. The Dayton Accord was concluded on 21 November. The main points of the plan were as follows: NATO troops were going to supervise the separation of forces; Bosnia would be an internationally recognized state within its present borders; the state would be composed of two entities –the Bosnian Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation-; human rights were to be monitored by an independent commission; free elections were to take place under international supervision; the central government would include a parliament, presidency, and a constitutional court; people indicted for war crimes were to be excluded from political life; refugees would be allowed to return to their homes or seek equitable compensation; Sarajevo, the capital, would remain united under the Muslim-Croat Federation.[130]

Although fighting was stopped, everybody had its complains about the Dayton Accords. Balkan leaders expressed their dissatisfaction even during the process, but the US left no other choice for them. The European leaders of the Contact Group complained that they were kept abreast of the developments and stated that the Dayton Accords were not much different from the plan they had put forth the year before. Initially, it was true that the plan was not much different from the other ones. What caused the breakthrough was the decisive operation of the US and the diplomatic approach of Holbrooke.

The diplomatic passiveness of Germany during the Dayton negotiations was the same as its European partners. While during the developments leading to Dayton Germany attempted to give support to the US with the aim of stopping the ongoing war, during the Dayton process it took a protectionist attitude towards its European partners. Apparently, the Germans did not want the EU to be undermined in international politics.[131] In respect to the Dayton Accords, NATO troops were to be deployed in Bosnia. Although still being debated at home, the issue lost its attraction; but the public seemed to have got used to German military cooperation.[132]

CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION

During much of the Cold-War period Germany or as it was officially known, Federal Republic of Germany, was under heavy political restrictions because of its war guilt in the Second World War. Its foreign policy-formulation process was always under scrutiny by the victorious Allied Powers. It regained some freedom in the 1960s and especially 1970s in terms of foreign policy-making, nevertheless, its decision-making was still heavily influenced by its relations with the West in general, and with the US in particular. All these constraints imposed upon Bonn following the World War II led to the development of a new political culture in Germany that enjoined a passive international attitude. That, in turn, shaped the way new generations' approach to world affairs.

All this was certainly in line with the way the Allies after the War looked at Germany: the country should be allowed to develop, and the West should encourage and even help German development. But it ought not to be allowed to regain its former role at the heart of Europe and threaten European peace as it did prior to the Second World War. Germany, which was by no means able to refuse this new state of affairs on the European continent, flourished economically and became an economic super power within a few decades following the World War II. Towards the end of the Cold War period, it was

the leading economic power within the EC/EU which was originally set up in the early 1950s to contain Germany.

By the time all the communist regimes began to fall one after the other in the former Eastern European countries, Germany looked well-disposed to play an important role in Eastern Europe with its huge economic resources. Indeed, from late 1960s onwards Germany had established economic relations with these countries. The fall of the Berlin Wall which had symbolized for decades the division of larger Germany after the Second World War brought about the unification of these two German states, an event which had world-wide repercussions. This obviously stirred up enormous euphoria throughout Germany: it was the end of communism, as well as the division of a nation. It was also a triumph of democracy and free market economy over a totalitarian system and a state-run economy.

Although a historic event and very important for Germany, it was not problem-free. It imposed a huge economic burden over Germany. More importantly, it gave rise to suspicions in Western Europe about the directions Germany would go: Some speculated, unified Germany would dominate the EC and dictate its foreign policy wishes, at least, in the region around itself though the Germans were by no means prepared for a new wave of power

politics: the political culture flourished for four decades after the war excluded the idea of power politics. Instead it focused on economic development and the creation of a Europe which would absorb Germany, not the other way around.

When the Yugoslav dissolution erupted into violence in the summer of 1991 with the Serbianised-Yugoslav army tanks attacking the break-away republic of Slovenia, Germany, like the West in general, sat back and watched. It was still overwhelmed by the unification, the financial burden of which had by then begun to hit the Germany society throughout. In addition, it was heavily involved in the transition process of the EC that was making preparations to turn itself into a political union. This meant that Bonn, like all the other Western capitals, looked initially to Washington for advice on the Yugoslav crisis. This sort of attitude had, in fact, been the established policy line in Bonn. During the Cold-War, Germany's strong military traditions had been clipped away. As a result, Bonn governments had become accustomed to simply adopting themselves to the American policy-making instead of trying to come up with clear-cut independent policy suggestions.

Again, it was Washington that was to lead the Western world. The American Secretary of State, James Baker, had visited Belgrade soon before the

Yugoslav flare-up in early june 1991. He and his colleagues in Washington considered Yugoslavia's preservation an important goal of the US. For one thing, Yugoslavia's dissolution would set a bad precedent for the Soviet Union which the US and Western Europe were endeavoring to hold together with Gorbachev at its head. Otherwise, a bloody dissolution of the Soviet Union might lead to unpredictable and undesirable consequences for European security. Indeed, there were already secessionist movements throughout the Soviet Union. For another, any chaos of an ethnic nature which would ensue the break-up of Yugoslavia might pin the European countries against each other and disrupt the EC/EU process. There were many in the Western world at the time who predicted the pandora's box if Yugoslavia was broken up into pieces.

Germany simply adhered to this American line which was soon embraced by all the Western countries although the German public in general was now firmly in favour of the right to self-determination for nations following the unification. It soon became difficult for Germany to stick to this line of policy: it was directly affected by the effects of what was happening in former Yugoslavia. Hundreds of thousands of refugees streaming out of former Yugoslav territories as s result of ethnic cleansing campaign conducted by Serb forces in Croatia and in Bosnia ended up in Germany. Horrifying

pictures of this ethnic cleansing filled the screens every day, creating a clamor in the country as in the whole world for action to stop it. German public became disgusted at the destruction of all those holiday resorts they had frequented in the past.

In addition, for the first time in recent German political history, two major parties began talking similarly on a foreign policy issue. The Christian Democrats, CDU, who were the leading coalition party, and their constituencies clamored for action, as well as the main opposition, SPD. Indeed, the public was so distressed by the continuous television coverage of the Croatian war, it was almost impossible for these two major parties not to respond to the public expectations. This meant that the Free Democratic Party, FDP, which was, and still is, the junior partner in the cabinet, felt the need to also respond to the public pressure: it owed its existence to the rivalry between the CDU and the SPD. The Foreign Minister, Hans Dietrich-Genscher, leader of the FDP thought that he should be more in line with public pressure than the other two parties.

The first consequence of these internal politics was that the German government began to press its partners in the EC/EU for the recognition of the break-away republics. There was more to that than the German internal

politics. Meanwhile, one of the main hurdles in the way of accepting the Yugoslav disintegration had been overcome. Following the unsuccessful August coup against Gorbachev in Moscow, the Soviet Union began to fall apart, and towards December 1991, no-one believed in the West that the Soviet would survive into the year of 1992. Indeed, in the course of the first two weeks, the Kremlin leaders had agreed to the division of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the negotiations which the EC countries had been involved in Maastrich with a view to turning the EC into a political union had been concluded at the beginning of December. This relieved the EC countries in general, and Germany, in particular. The Bonn government thought that all Europe and the US should take these new realities into account by considering the recognition of break-away republics.

However Germany's European partners preferred to use the case as an opportunity for trade off during the Maastricht negotiations for the future of the EC. Britain, which had been pressing for the insertion of an opt-out clause on foreign and defence policies in the Maastricht treaty, used it as a trade-off as against the German demand for recognition of break-away republics of former Yugoslavia. In the end Germany did convince its partners for recognition, but the international impact of the issue was not very pleasant for the Bonn government. Starting with 1992 Germany was made the scape goat

for the endless war and was accused for blowing up a country. The Western press, in particular, claimed that the imperial threat for Europe had come back.

All this was to make Germany extremely timid. In the Bosnia war which erupted at the end of March and lasted longer than three years with more excesses than the previous Yugoslav wars, began to pull back step by step. It let its European partners take the upper hand in the political decisions of the EU regarding Yugoslavia. The Bonn governments had to keep a low profile although Germany was more directly affected by the effects of the war in Bosnia - within a very short time after the start of the war in Bosnia hundreds of thousands of refugees that fled the war came up to the Bavarian border.

The only German diplomatic activity during a good part of the Bosnia war was the support the Bonn government gave to the United States. Each time the US administration proposed something which savoured of military intervention in order to stop the atrocities and force the Serbs to the negotiating table, Germany was prepared to support the US either tacitly or openly. What Germany was most concerned with during this period under review was the EU solidarity. Bosnia war, all the atrocities and the genocidal war to which German public remained very sensitive had to be weighed against the importance of the EU. The general view in the EU was that for the

first time since the 19th century the Europeans were able to keep united despite a long-running war in the Balkans. It seems that Germany had to also draw consolation from this view. Therefore, though Germany showed signs of willingness to support the US in the way of military intervention, it had to do it very carefully without giving rise to suspicions that unified Germany was out to further its own selfish, imperialistic interests rather than to stick to the EU solidarity.

There also limitations to what Germany could do in support of US actions. True, German public clamored for action to stop the genocidal war, but it was also vary cautious about the use of German military even under NATO or UN umbrella. The powerful German constitutional court and its interpretation of whether or not the Government could order German units to participate in any operation in Bosnia remained a nightmare for German policy-makers for a considerable time. In the end German government overcame this constitutional hurdle, but the Bonn government was still careful in its military participation: no combat troops were ordered into Bosnia. Instead, Germany's participation was mostly logistical for the Allied forces.

It appears that much of the speculation about Germany's `strong aims' in the Balkans which became prevalent in Western Europe's press as well as in

Turkey are not borne out by a study of German foreign policy during the first half of the 1990s. Germany's concern about the Balkans seems to be based more on the issues, such as refugees and so forth, rather than strategical interests. It seems that Germany economic and strategic focus has been firmly in Eastern Europe and European Russia.

ENDNOTES

Notes For Chapter II

[1] As the war continued, the Allied Powers were debating the political and military restructuring of Europe and Germany for the post-war period. To this end, the foreign ministers of Britain, the US and the USSR were arranging a serious of conferences. In October 1943, they met in Moscow and decided to 'set up a machinery for ensuring the closest cooperation between the three Governments in the examination of European questions arising as the war develops.' J. K. Sowden, **The German Question 1945-1973: Continuity in Change.** New York: St. Martin's, 1975, 58. The European Advisory Commission was the machinery serving to this means. The Commission was responsible of making detailed recommendations to the three Powers on a joint post-war policy towards the European states that they were at war. Specifically the intention under the term 'European states' was Germany.

[2] There is a fairly large literature on the occupation of Germany in 1945, since it was a direct consequence of the Second World War. For the objectives of the allied powers in 1945, see, for instance, Frank Ninkovitch, **Germany and the United States**. New York, Canada: Twayne, Macmillan, 1995, 48-73. Also, see, Dennis L. Bark & David R. Gress, **From Shadow to Substance: 1945-1963**. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989, 21-62.

[3] Wolfram Hanrieder, **Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy**. New Heaven & London: Yale University, 1989, 5. In regard to the United States' double containment policy, see also, Frank Ninkovitch, **Ibid**., 74-99.

[4] Timothy Garton Ash, **In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent**. London: Jonathan Cape, 1993, 1-27. The author defines Germany as 'the divided center of a divided Europe' and emphasizes on Germany's centrality within the essence of the Cold War.

[5] Frank Ninkovitch, (1995), **op.cit**., 56.

[6] See Constantine Menges, **The Future of Germany and the Atlantic Alliance**. Washington D.C.: AEI press, 1991, 22-25. Also, see, Gebhard Schweigler, **Grundlagen der aussenpolitischen Orientierungen der BRD.** Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1985, 53-62. Also, see. Dennis L. Bark & David R. Gress, (1989), **op.cit**., 261-271.

[7] Frank Ninkovitch, (1995), **op.cit.**, 74-75.

[8] Frank Ninkovitch, **Ibid.**, 77. For German remilitarization, see, also, Dennis L. Bark & David R. Gress, (1989), **op.cit**., 366-372.

[9] Paul Weymar, **Adenauer.** New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1957, 350-365.

[10] Willy Brandt, **Begegnungen und Einsichten**. Hamburg: Hoffman & Campe, 1976, 168.

[11] 'The overcoming of the division of Germany, it was argued, reqiured first overcoming –or at least reducing- the division of Europe.' Timothy Garton Ash, (1993), **op.cit.**, 54-55. For more on Ostpolitik, see, Willy Brandt **Erinnerungen.** Frankfurt a.M.: Propylaen, 1989, 154-180. Also, see. Dennis L. Bark & David R. Gress, **Democracy and its Discontents: 1963-1988**. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989, 137-201.

[12] See, Dennis L. Bark & David R. Gress, **Ibid.**, 365-367.

[13] For all the issues concerning the economic recession and the reconciliation of the intra European relations, see, Dennis L. Bark & David R. Gress, **Ibid.**, 281-338.

[14] For details on the Two plus Four Talks see, Gilbert Gornig, **"Die Vertraegliche Regelung der mit der deutschen Vereinigung verbundenen auswaertigen Probleme,"** **Aussenpolitik.** 1/1991,3-12.

[15] William Wallace, **"Deutschland als Europaeische Fuehrungsmacht,"** **Internationale Politik.** 5/1995, 23-28. Much debate has taken place on the dimensions of the political power of Germany. Norbert Walter, (**"Vom Wirtschaftriesen zum politischen Riesen?,"** **Internationale Politik.** 2/1997. 55-58), claims that, Germany together with the weight of Kohl has turned out to define and lead the EU agenda.

[16] Martin & Sylvia Greiffenhagen, **"Hypothek der Vergangenheit: Belastungen der aussenpolitischen Handlungsfaehigkeit"** **Internationale Politik**. 8/1995, 22-23. The historical constrain on German foreign policy was treated as an important issue of German foreign policy analysis. See. Gregor Schoellgen, **"Geschichte als Argument,"** **Internationale Politik**. 2/1997, 1-7. Also, see, Karl-Rudolf Korte, **"Was denken die Anderen ueber uns?,"** **Internationale Politik**. 2/1997, 47-54. For further arguments. see also, Wilfred von Bredow & Thomas Jaeger, **Neue Deutsche Aussenpolitik: Nationale Interessen in internationalen Beziehungen.** Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1993, 92-101; states that Germany, in order to try to escape from the aggressiveness of the past, falls into a position lacking responsibility.

[17] Timothy Garton Ash, (1993), **op.cit**., 386-387. The author puts forth an argument questioning the difference between a European Germany and a German Europe and concludes that they are within one another. See, also, Hans-Peter Schwarz, **"Germany's National and European Interests,"** **Daedalus.** Spring 1994, 81-105. Schwarz argues that Germany lacked the definition of its national interests during the period immediately after the unification and formulated its interests within the EU; he says that 'recent German history and experience have made it impossible for Germans to use the concept of "national interest" as unself-consciously as their French and British neighbors.'(p.85). Also, see, Daniel Vernet, **"Europaeisches Deutschland oder deutsches Europa?,"** **Internationale Politik**. 2/1997, 15-21; Vernet says that 'whether the Germans want it or not, Germany has again become a Power, certainly not a world power, maybe nor a great power, but a middle power and a Power in the Middle, which is the greatest European Power to the west of Russia.'(p.20).

[18] Arnulf Baring, **"Wie neu ist unsere Lage?,"** **Internationale Politik.** 4/1995, 15.

[19] "If we do not stabilize the East, the East will destabilize us." Roman Herzog, **"Die Grundkoordinaten Deutscher Aussenpolitik,"** **Internationale Politik.** 4/1995, 7.

[20] Heinz Kramer, **"Die EG und die Stabilisierung Osteuropas,"** **Aussenpolitik.** 1/1992, 12-21.

[21] Christopher Daase & Michael Jochum, **" 'Partner in einer Fuehruhgsrolle'?: Das einige Deutschland aus der Sicht der USA,"**

Aussenpolitik. 3/1992, 237-255. The article lays out the criteria that the US expects of Germany in regard to 'partner in leadership'; in national dimension Germany was expected to have a democratic tradition, within the European and global context Germany was expected to take a leading role. Also, see, William R. Smyser, **"Sonderbeziehung mit Deutschland,"** **Internationale Politik.** 2/1997, 41-46.

[22] For more on the details of WEU and CSCE, see, Wilfred von Bredow & Thomas Jaeger, (1993), **op.cit.,** 147-155. Also, see, Gerhard Wettig, **"Sicherheit in Europa – eine herausfordernde Aufgabe,"** **Aussenpolitik**. 1/1992, 3-11.

[23] Sensitivity in these criteria make a 'civil power' out of Germany. See, Hanns W. Maull, **"Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik Deutschland,"** **Europa-Archiv**. 10/1992, 269-278. Germany, indeed, showed reluctance towards its allies in several military cooperations. During the Gulf Crisis of 1990, for instance, Germany refused to take an active military role. Genscher argued that if its partners want Germany to take more responsibility, then Germany should in return receive more say (which referred to Germany becoming a permanent member in the UN Security Council.). See, Reinhard Stuth, **"Deutschlands neue Rolle im sich wandelnden Europa,"** **Aussenpolitik.** 1/1992, 22-32.

[24] "In 1987 Conservative politicians in Germany began to translate international changes into a new political strategy. The transnational competition between the economic centers and the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) was at the center of attention... The degree of internationalization of the German economy made it necessary for the Federal Republic to secure its position within the international system by purely multinational means." See, Lothar Gutjahr, **German Foreign and Defense Policy after Unification.** London: Pinter, 1994, 41.

Notes For Chapter III

[25] The Croats and the Serbs have been of the same racial origin and spoke the same language, but the Croats were Catholic and the Serbs Orthodox and as history proved, religion was and is a relevant feature of identity which can lead to disputes, wars and even massacres in the Balkans. Several books written on the Balkan history emphasize to this reality. See, for instance, Sabrina Petra Ramet, **Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia**

from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War. Colorado and Oxford: Westview, 1996, 135-184. See, also, Christopher Bennett, **Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences**. London: Hurst & Company, 1995, 16-28.

[26] During the Second World War, Hitler blamed the Serbs for much of the trouble in the Balkans, in relation with his doctrine that the Slavs were the most wicked race on earth. For this reason, he gave support to the Croat nationalists. See, Eberhard Rondholz, **"Deutsche Erblasten im Yugoslawischen Buergerkrieg,"** **Blaetter fuer Deutsche und Internationale Politik**. 7/1992, 829-838. Also, see, Stevan K. Pavlowitch, **Tito; Yugoslavia's Great Dictator: A Reassesment**. London: C. Hurst & Co., 1992, 30-49. For the events leading to the establishment of the second Yugoslavia, see, Barbara Jelavich, **History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century.** Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, 384-403. Also, see, L. S. Stavrianos, **History of the Balkans since 1453.** New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Wilson, 1965, 771-784, 813-818.

[27] For Tito's Yugoslavia, see, Mark Almond, **Europe's Backyard War: The War in the Balkans.** London: Heinemann, 1994, 150-170. Also, see, Stevan K. Pavlowitch, **The Improbable Survivor: Yugoslavia and its Problems, 1918-1988.** Columbus: Ohio State University, 1988, 112-128.

[28] For Tito's balance politics, see, Anton Bebler, **"Der Untergang des Jugoslawischen Modells des foederalistischen Kommunismus,"** **Europaeische Rundschau**. 3-20.

[29] For the political debate of the 1980s, see, Sabrina Petra Ramet, (1996), **op.cit**., 7-18. Also, see, V. P. Gagnon Jr., **"Yugoslavia: Prospects for Stability,"** **Foreign Affairs.** Summer,1991, 17-35.

[30] See, Branka Magas, **The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up 1980-1992.** London & New York: Verso, 1993, 49-73. Also, see, Philip J. Cohen, **"The Complicity of Serbian Intellectuals in Genocide in the 1990s,"** in **This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia.** ed. Thomas Cushman & Stjepan G. Mestrovic, New York: New York University Press, 1996, 39-63.

[31] For the economic and social circumstances on the eve of the break-up, see, Susan L. Woodward, **Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War.** Washington D.C.: Brookings, 1995, 88-101.

[32] Mark Almond, (1994), **op.cit**., 183-186.

[33] See Victor Meier, **Wie Jugoslawien Verspielt wurde**. Munich: Beck, 1995, 287-289.

[34] Slovenia and Croatia had little in common besides their search for independence. There always existed a distance between the two states. Both were aware that their alliance was not a permanent one and trust can not hold very long. See, Victor Meier, (1995), **op.cit**., 280-281.

[35] The Serb justification for entering Croatia was to 'protect the endangered Serb minority' in Croatia but it seized 35 Percent of Croatian territory where as the Serb minority made up only about ten percent of the total population. See, Philip J. Cohen, **"War and Peace in Former Yugoslavia,"** in **Genocide After Emotion: The Postemotional Balkan War.** ed. Stjepan G. Mestrovic, London, New York: Routledge, 1996, 34-35.

[36] For the War in Slovenia and Croatia, see, Norman Cigar, **"The Serbo-Croatian War, 1991,"** in **op.cit.,** ed. Stjepan G. Mestrovic, (1996), 51-90. Also, see, Mark Almond, **op.cit.**, (1994), 213-226.

[37] Stevan K. Pavlowitch, **"Who is 'Balkanizing' Whom? The Misunderstanding Between the Debris of Yugoslavia and an Unprepared West,"** **Deadalus**. Spring, 1994, 212. On Germany's stance in the June 1991 CSCE meeting, see, **Deutsche Aussenpolitik nach der Einheit 1990-1993: Eine Dokumentation.** Bonn: Auswaertiges Amt, 1993, 71-76. For the overall western view, see, also, Ranko Petkovic, **"Die Haltung der Grossmaechte, der europaeischen und insbesondere der Nachbarstaaten zur Wahrung der politischen Unabhaengigheit und territorialen Integitaet Jugoslawiens,"** **Suedosteuropa.** 7-8/1990, 484-495.

[38] For the decisions of the Brioni, see, **"Dokumente zum Konflikt in Jugoslawien,"** **Europa-Archiv**, 21/1991, 144-147.

[39] The Europeans, at first stage, perceived the war in Yugoslavia as an ordinary issue, which they could resolve easily by their political power; their assumption was "that the 'great and good' of the international community had only to bark and the squabbling Balkan tribes would stop their disruption of the peace marked the opening phase of the conflict" Mark

Almond, (1994), **op.cit**., 233. As a former Secretary General of NATO and a former British Foreign Minister, Peter Carrington was believed to be the best candidate for mediation. The fact that he had settled the conflict in Zimbabwe in 1980, earned him extra credits in the eyes of international community. See, also, James Gow, **Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav Crisis.** London: Hurst & Company, 1997, 53. For the rejection of German stance, see, Arthur Heinrich, **"Neue Deutsche Aussenpolitik: Selbstversuche zwischen Zagreb und Bruessel,"** **Blaetter fuer Deutsche und Internationale Politik.** 12/1991, 1446-1448.

[40] Hans-Dietrich Genscher, **Erinnerungen.** Berlin: Siedler Verlag GmbH, 1995, 949.

[41] James Gow, (1997), op.cit., 53-54.

[42] Martin Rosefeldt, **"Deutschlands und Frankreichs Jugoslawienpolitik im Rahmen der Europaeischen Gemeinschaft (1991-1993),"** **Suedosteuropa**. 11-12/1993, 641-642.

[43] Lenard J. Cohen, **Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition.** Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview, 1995, 239.

[44] The promise 'before Christmas of 1991' was given by Kohl to the presidents of Croatia and Slovenia during their visit to Germany in the beginning of December 1991; see, **"Die Frist laeuft ab,"** **Der Spiegel**. 50/1991, 25. For the European debate on the overall recognitions, see, Martin Rosefeldt, (11-12/1993), **op.cit**., 627-633.

[45] In statistics of Summer 1992, the number of refugees that Germany had to handle with, due to the war in Yugoslavia was more than 200 thousand, a number almost exceeding the total number of refugees that the other EU member-states had to face with; see, **"Eine Million auf dem Sprung,"** **Der Spiegel**. 31/1992, 18-23.

[46] Heinz-Juergen Axt, **"Hat Genscher Yugoslawien entzweit?: Mythen und Fakten zur Aussenpolitik des vereinten Deutschlands,"** **Europa-Archiv**. 12/1993, 354.

[47] Paul B. Stares, **The New Germany and the New Europe**. Washington D. C.: Brookings, 1992,150. For domestic circumstances also, see, Heinz-Juergen Axt, (12/1993). **Ibid**.

[48] Mark Almond, (1994), **op.cit.**, 237.

[49] **"Kampf dem Vierten Reich," Der Spiegel**. 50/1991, 26. The Serb accusation went as far as to claim that after the reunification, Germany aimed to re-annex southeast Europe.

[50] For German pressure on Croatia, see, Susan L. Woodward, (1995), **op.cit.**, 190-191. See, also, Wolfgang Krieger, **"Towards a Gaullist Germany?," World Policy Journal**. Spring 1994, 32-33. Krieger states that 'blaming Bonn became a convenient way' for the deadlocks of European diplomacy in Yugoslavia. For the impacts of German recognition on the Badinter Plan, see, Heinz-Juergen Axt, (12/1993), **op.cit.**, 355.

[51] Wolfgang Krieger, **Ibid.**

[52] See, Rabia Ali & Lawrence Lifschultz, **"Separating History from Myth: An Interview with Ivo Banac,"** in Rabia Ali & Lawrence Lifschultz (ed.) **Writings on the Balkan War: Why Bosnia?.** Connecticut: The Pamphleteer's, 1993, 148. According to Ivo Banac, a leading Balkan expert, Germany 'played a very limited game' in Yugoslavia by pulling back after recognitions. He bases this claim on Germany's being a diplomatic and economic power but not a military power. He also emphasizes the historical restrain on Germany that traces back to Hitler period.

[53] Gregor Schoellgen, (2/1997), **op.cit**.; "...due to the shadow of the past Germany has forgotten to think in terms of power politics and is today afraid of giving any perception to its allies that would remind the past." Heinz-Juergen Axt.(12/1993), **op.cit**., 354; "the German initiative could not give out a positive consequence due to Bonn's need to show reluctance and passivism towards its partners."

Notes For Chapter IV

[54] There is the politico-geographical handbook written by the Byzantine Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus in 958 that mention Bosnia as a separate territory: 'in baptized Serbia are the inhabited cities of

Destinikon(etc.) ... and in the territory of Bosona...' Noel Malcolm, **Bosnia: A Short History.** London: Macmillan, 1994, 10.

[55] 'All that one can say about the ethnic identity of the Bosnians is this: they were the Slavs who lived in Bosnia.' Noel Malcolm, (1994), **Ibid.**, 12.

[56] See Noel Malcolm, (1994), **Ibid.**, 43-63,140-212.

[57] Jens Reuter, **"Die Politische Entwicklung in Bosnien-Hercegovina,"** **Suedosteuropa**, 11-12/1992, 665.

[58] Sabrina Petra Ramet, (1996), **op.cit.**, 246-247.

[59] For the War in Bosnia in 1992, see, Mark Almond, (1994), **op.cit.**, 270-273.

[60] Susan Woodward, (1995), **op.cit.**, 191. The author criticizes German reluctance and adds that if Germany had acted in the Bosnian issue as enthusiastically as in the Croatian case, it could have dictated the recognition of the borders of Bosnia before nationalism had come to surface.

[61] Klaus Kinkel, **"Deutschland in Europa: Zu den Zielen der Deutschen Praesidentschaft in der Europaeischen Union,"** **Europa-Archiv.** 12/1992, 335-342.

[62] James Gow, (1997), **op.cit.**, 172-173.

[63] So much was written on the genocide in Bosnia, both during the war and afterwards, but the West showed reluctance to stop it. See, Ibrahim Kajan, **"Is this not Genocide?,"** in ed. Rabia Ali & Lawrence Lifschultz, (1993), **op.cit.**, 86-97. Also, see, Michael Sells, **"Religion, History, and Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina,"** ed. G. Scott Davis, **Religion and Justice in the War over Bosnia.** New York: Routledge, 1996, 24-39.

[64] However this was a policy destined to failure. Jens Reuter, **"Jugoslawien: Versagen der Internationalen Gemeinschaft?,"** **Suedosteuropa.** 6/1993, 333-343. Reuter argues that for the industrialized Western world, economic sanctions were believed to be a factor for deterrence. He criticizes that the West was unable to analyze the dynamics of politics in the Balkans, where economic sanctions can not stop the national aspirations. He further argues that the failure of western diplomacy began with the recognition of Bosnia,

since the West was unable to protect and defend the rights of a state that it had recognized as a sovereign entity.

[65] James Gow, **Ibid.**, 90.

[66] Mark Almond, (1994), **op.cit.**, 271-281.

[67] **"Toter Vogel,"** **Der Spiegel.** 29/1992, 22.

[68] Sabrina Ramet, (1996), **op.cit.**, 248.

[69] **"Nahe Dran im Echten Krieg,"** **Der Spiegel**. 30/1992, 22-23.

[70] Martin Rosefeldt, **"Deutschlands und Frankreichs Jugoslawienpolitik im rahmen der Europaeischen Gemeinschaft (1991-1993),"** **Suedosteuropa.** 11-12/1993, 638-640.

[71] Sabrina Ramet, (1996), **op.cit.**, 249-250.

[72] For the critique and impacts of the Vance-Owen, see, Adolf Karger, **"Der Gescheiterte Vance-Owen Plan und die ethnisch-geographischen Strukturen von Bosnien-Herzegowina,"** **Ost Europa**. August, 1993, 785-791. Also, see, Lenard J. Cohen, (1995), **op.cit.**, 251-261.

[73] Susan Woodward, (1995), **op.cit.**, 243-244.

[74] For 'lift and strike' see, James Gow, (1997), **op.cit.**, 218-220.

[75] A 'safe area' was a place given international protection under Chapter 7 of the UN charter. In the Bosnia case, these were specific cities under attack of Serbian artillery, which were aimed to be demilitarized through UNPROFOR supervision of the withdrawal of Bosnian Serb military and paramilitary units. Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac were selected as safe areas. See, Susan Woodward, (1995), **op.cit.**, 307.

[76] "Based on a draft written by Croatian President Tudjman and approved by Serbian President Milosevic, the plan reflected the military gains of Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats and appeared to confirm the victory of the alternative scenario for Bosnia-Herzegovina looming in the background since the Tudjman-Milosevic discussions of January 1990-March 1991 to partition the republic." Susan Woodward, **Ibid.**, 310.

[77] Sabrina Ramet, (1996), **op.cit**., 251.

[78] Especially debated was the Muslim opening to the Adriatic and Danube, as well as the status of Sarajevo and Mostar. See, Marie-Janine Calic, **"Duestere Aussichten fuer Bosnien-Herzegowina,"** **Europa-Archiv**. 3/1994, 71-79.

[79] "The Bonn government sees itself walking a tightrope. When the Clinton administration announced in October 1993 that it would withdraw American troops from Somalia by early 1994, the German defense minister immediately followed suit with a similar statement, thereby demonstrating that Germany could not even handle a non-combat UN mission without US protection." See, Wolfgang Krieger, **"Towards a Gaullist Germany?: Some Lessons From the Yugoslav Crisis,"** **World Policy Journal**. Spring, 1994, 33. Also, see, Ernst Benda, **"Deutsche Aussenpolitik vor Gericht: Bundesverfassungsgericht und auswaertige Gewalt,"** **Internationale Politik**. 12/1995, 39-44. Ernst Benda refers to the US Supreme Court to show the difference between Germany and US. The US Supreme Court authorizes the government to use armed force in high political objections with the clause 'Political-Question-Doctrine', whereas the German judicial tradition is totally unfamiliar with words related to politics for the use of the armed forces.

[80] Wolgang Krieger, **Ibid.,** 34. Krieger states that Germany 'contributed more than $10 billion (roughly a third of its defense budget!) to a war in which it had no say.'

[81] At a press conference of Summer 1992 Kinkel states: "the foreign pressure is increasing, everybody is asking me, when we will at last be part of the team." See, **"Toter Vogel,"** **Der Spiegel**. 29/1992, 23.

[82] See, Harald Mueller, **"Military Intervention for European Security: The German Debate,"** **The Political Quarterly**. Annual Book, 1994, 128.

[83] **Ibid.**, 129.

[84] **"'Das ist keine Drohgebaerde': Gespraech mit Verteidigungsminister Volker Ruehe ueber den Uno-Einsatz der Bundeswehr,"** **Der Spiegel**. 30/1992, 32-34.

[85] **"Toter Vogel,"** **op.cit**., 23.

[86] **"Nahe dran am echten Krieg,"** **Der Spiegel**. 30/1992, 22-29. The article refers to the public opinion polls, stating that 69 percent of the German people support German cooperation in the Blue Helmet actions of the UN, but more than half of these people are against German cooperation when it means a preparation for and inclusion in a stage of warfare. The liberal and social democrat politicians and intellectuals support this position in the political arena and argue that Germany should only get involved by 'peaceful' means into a war. By peaceful means they refer to economic sanctions and humanitarian aids.

[87] **"Suche Nach Nischen,"** **Der Spiegel**. 35/1992, 66-68. The German General Georg Bautzmann warned against the risks and complexity of a military intervention to Bosnia and stated that Germany should remain reluctant. So did the Minister of Defense Volker Ruehe. Klaus Kinkel, said that he would have been pleased to see the Serbs on their knees but unfortunately, for the known constitutional and historical obstacles it was unthinkable that the Bundeswehr could be part of a military intervention.

[88] For the verbal agreement between Kohl and Vogel in 1990, see, **"Nahe dran im echten Krieg,"** **Ibid.**, 27. For SPD going to the Constitutional Court and the decision of the Court, see, Harald Mueller, **"Military Intervention for European Security: The German Debate,"** **op.cit.**, 129; see, also **Deutsche Aussenpolitik nach der Einheit 1990-1993: Eine Dokumentation**. Bonn: Auswaertiges Amt, 1993,

[89] For the domestic reactions and interpretations on Germany's contribution to the NATO AWACS airborne monitoring and control flights, see, **"...morgen die ganze Welt,"** **Der Spiegel**. 16/1993, 18-22.

Notes For Chapter V

[90] **"Kroatien droht abermals mit Militaerintervention in Bosnien,"** **Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)**, 3 January 1994. In his declaration Tudjman claimed that the outside world should at last be aware that the Muslims were no more the victims of the civil war, but the offenders –such as the Serbs- practicing 'ethnic cleansing'. See, also, **"In Bosnien missbraucht,"** **FAZ**, 7 January 1994. For the meeting in Bonn, see, **"Neuer kroatischer Vorschlag fuer Bosnien,"** **FAZ**, 11 January 1994; for the reasons of deadlock of the meeting, see, **"Kroatien Praesident Tudjman erhebt Vorwuerfe gegen die Muslime: Ergebnisloses Ende der Bonner Gespraeche,"** **FAZ**, 12 January 1994. The articles refer to the arguments

that led to deadlock between Tudjman and Izzetbegovic. Tudjman stated that Mostar was a pure Croat city and did not want to accept that it was a city home to both Muslims and Croats. He was also not approving the Muslim proposal of having an opening to the Adriatic.

[91] **"Die NATO droht den Serben mit Luftangriffen,"** **FAZ**, 12 January 1994.

[92] **"Die Uno stoert uns,"** **Der Spiegel**. 4/1995, 131-132. Tudjman, in public however, reasoned the Croat-Muslim alliance in a different manner. He stated that the Muslims tried to establish a fundamentalist Islamic State in the heart of Europe which the Western world wished to avoid. The Croatian alliance with the Muslims, so Tudjman claims, was of strategic significance to contain the Muslims from radicalization.

[93] See, James Gow, (1997), **op.cit**., 261. Also, see, Lenard J. Cohen, (1995), **op.cit.**, 304.

[94] For Yeltsin's dilemma in deciding to support the NATO initiative, see, Lenard J. Cohen, (1995). **op.cit**., 299-302. For the Serb criticism of Russian attitude, see, **"Post-euphoria,"** **The Economist**. 2 April 1994, 32; "The Serbs find themselves in the hardest position. They feel let down by the Russians, whom they accuse of backing the American demand for territorial integrity of both Bosnia and Croatia. They had expected the Russians to champion their cause out of self-interest, plus cousinly Russian-Serb affection... Bosnia's Serbs have opted to play for time. One of their officials in Pale waxes lyrical about Turkish-controlled northern Cyprus. It may lack international recognition, he says, 'but it is indubitably a state, just as we are.' The difference is that Turkey, unlike Serbia, is not under crippling sanctions."

[95] **"Bluff called,"** **The Economist**. 23 April 1994, 29; "When, on April 10th and 11th, NATO struck, they stopped shelling the Muslims in Gorazde enclave for a few hours. Then, like naughty children, they realized that the pain of the punishment was eminently bearable. A NATO jet was shot down. The Serbs took heart. Suddenly the West realized that its bluff was being called."

[96] James Gow, (1997), **op.cit**., 260-261.

[97] For the division, see, Sabrina Petra Ramet, (1996), **op.cit**., 257. Also, see, James Gow, **Ibid.** For the rejection of Karadzic, see, **"Mann gegen Mann,"**

Der Spiegel. 30/1994, 1160117. For a critique on the proportion foreseen for Serbs, see, Johann Georg Reissmueller, **"Milosevic kann zufrieden sein,"** FAZ, 21 July 1994; Reissmueller criticizes the 'tolerance' of the West towards the Serbs and states that within the 49 percent which the Plan grants the Serbs are places that have been originally of Croat or Muslim majority but have been ethnically cleansed during the war by the Serb paramilitary.

[98] **"Russland widerspricht: Das Embargo muss bleiben,"** FAZ, 19 October, 1994. Also, see, **"Amerika will auch ohne Erlaubnis Waffen liefern,"** FAZ, 20 October 1994.

[99] See, **"Pruegel vom Ziehvater,"** Der Spiegel. 32/1994, 120-122. The Serb leaders could no more give a picture of one and the General of the Bosnian Serb army, Ratko Mladic, was also a side to this rivalry. See, **"Die Meister der Krieges sind uneins,"** Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 3 September 1994.

[100] **"Milosevic fordert Serben zur Einstellung der Kaempfe auf,"** Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 22 October, 1994.

[101] **"USA planen Militaerhilfe in Milliardenhoehe fuer Bosnien,"** Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 20 November 1994.

[102] Josef Joffe, **"Der Zweite Bosnische Krieg,"** Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 20 November 1994. The UN Commander Michael Rose confirmed in an interview that the embargo has been broken for a long time; see, **"Alles faellt an die Serben,"** Der Spiegel. 48/1994, 143.

[103] Sabrina Petra Ramet, (1996), op.cit., 261. The Croat-Muslim alliance received arms from Pakistan, Iran, Germany, Poland, Bulgaria and even from Russia.

[104] **"UN: Kein Massaker bei Angriff bosnischer Muslime,"** FAZ, 8 October, 1994. Also, see, **"Muslime weiter im Vormarsch,"** Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 9 November 1994.

[105] Susan L. Woodward, (1995), op.cit., 398; " The United States asserted its leadership by accepting NATO responsibility for any withdrawal of UN forces and insisting that, because the United States would commit ground troops, command and control would shift from the UN Secretary General and force commander to the United States,"

[106] **"Kozyrew lehnt Abzug der UNO-Truppen aus Bosnien ab,"** Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 2 December 1994.

[107] Sabrina Petra Ramet, (1996), op.cit., 266.

[108] **"Nun siegt mal schoen,"** Der Spiegel. 29/1994, 23-27. The UN Blue Helmet mission was being criticized for having an uncertain future due to its failures in the Past. The article sets cases of UN mission and states that little or nothing could have been changed in the conditions of the regions which the UN intervened for peace-keeping. The interpretation over the image of the Bundeswehr was that the defense-army was replaced by an intervention-army. By this decision the German government also expected to take a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.

[109] See, **"Raetsel aus Karlsruhe,"** Der Spiegel. 30/1994, 28-29. Also, see, **"Alles gedeckt,"** Der Spiegel. 30/1994, 29.

[110] **"Politik an die Front,"** Der Spiegel. 45/1994, 76. A debate had started in the country over the 'morality' and efficiency of the use of force for keeping peace. Some academics argued that if the government could produce successful political premises in the international diplomacy, there would have been no need for the use of force. Thus they accused the government for preferring the easier alternative –the use of force- instead of sound diplomatic initiatives.

[111] **"Das Notwendige tun – aber ohne Hurra,"** Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 17-18 December, 1994.

[112] **"Wie In Somalia,"** Der Spiegel. 49/1994, 18-21. Kinkel described previously his foreign policy as the 'culture of holding back'; Kohl declared that for 'historical reasons' German soldiers could not have anything to do in the Balkans.

[113] **"Da Muessen Wir Hin,"** Der Spiegel. 45/1994, 18-19.

[114] **"Bonn sagt der NATO Unterstuetzung zu: Aber keine Bodentruppen nach Bosnien,"** Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 18 December 1994. By 18 December Bonn agreed to back up NATO in Bosnia, but was still not approving the German troops on the ground.

[115] For the day by day chronology of Germany sending Tornados, see, Arthur Heinrich, **"Unternehmen Tornado,"** Blaetter fuer Deutsche und

Internationale Politik. 2/1995, 144-155. Heinrich also analyzes the factors leading to the shift of policy.

[116] **"Wie In Somalia,"** (49/1994), **op.cit.**, 18-21. Also, see, **"Kein Hurra Geschrien," Der Spiegel**. 51/1994, 18-21. That the positioning of first German troops on the ground after the Second World War was in the Balkans was regarded as an ironic faith. The Free Democrat Kinkel felt still not very comfortable with German soldiers in the Balkans, whereas the Defense Minister Volker Ruehe of Christian Democrat origin did not have such second thoughts and was more concerned about solidarity with the partners. Together with German contribution on the ground, an old unresolved topic of the war came again on the agenda: lifting of the arms embargo. Some German analysts argued whether the military contribution could have been avoided if the arms embargo on the Muslims had been lifted. Indeed, the government was at home still trying to avoid reactions by claiming that German troops were backing up their partners behind the scene and would be operating for the purpose of sanitary, humanitarian and military aid. The opposing view was curious about the slight difference between helping militarily and being directly in the military action. For the point of view of the top of German administration, see, **"Da bin ich Ungeduldig: Bundespraesident Roman Herzog ueber Bosnien-Einsaetze und Vergangenheitsbewaeltigung der Deutschen," Der Spiegel**. 51/1994, 22-24. Roman Herzog gave an interview, to Der Spiegel, supporting the stand of the government.

[117] **"Ein Elendes Verhalten," Der Spiegel**. 51/1994, 37-38. Also, see, **"Luft und Wasser," Der Spiegel**. 52/1994, 22-24.

[118] Rudolf Augstein, **"Unser Weg nach Sarajevo," Der Spiegel**. 52/1994, 23. "The betrayal of UN and NATO could not be repaired through German contribution: indeed, the German contribution could worsen the situation."

[119] **"Einsatz ins Ungewisse," Der Spiegel**. 5/1995, 68-79.

[120] **"Die Deutschen rauswerfen," Der Spiegel**. 21/1995, 142.

[121] **"Serbien ist Gottes Werk," Der Spiegel**. 23/1995, 130-139. Both the Europeans and the Americans seemed reluctant on the use of force. According to the article, all of the Western powers had second thoughts related to their historical experiences. The European powers France and Britain reminded themselves on their colonial background and argued that ethnic conflicts could not be solved by outside intervention. The United

States, on the other hand, was concerned about getting drawn into a second Vietnam scenario. To that time the US had no soldiers under UN command in the region and this was criticized as 'the Americans were fighting in Bosnia until the last European'. The Russians were regarded as of strategic importance for persuading the Serbs into the negotiation table. But Russia would not agree to this without a feed back. The foreign minister Kozyrew wanted to take an assurance that NATO would not practice a widening policy to the Eastern Europe.

[122] **"Nur noch Gewalt,"** **Der Spiegel**. 23/1995, 30-31.

[123] Rudolf Augstein, **"Bleibt draussen!,"** **Der Spiegel**. 25/1995, 38. The author states that German decision on the issue was not the result of a concrete policy; instead, it was the result of the 'fear from the friends'. The politicians of the new Germany could not bare the critiques coming from Paris, London and Washington.

[124] **"Letzter Versuch,"** **Der Spiegel**. 27/1995, 26-27. Kinkel's justification for the contribution of Bundeswehr was that the intention was a 'purely humanitarian' one.

[125] **"Dabeisein ist Alles,"** **Der Spiegel**. 26/1995, 23.

[126] **"Der Kurs ist Gefaehrlich,"** **Der Spiegel**. 24/1995, 146-147. The soldiers under UN command were complaining about their helplessness and lack of power.

[127] **Ibid**., 149-150.

[128] See. James Gow, (1997), **op.cit.,** 278.

[129] See. **"Dokumente: Grundprinzipien, zwischen Bosnien-Herzegowina, Kroatien und Jugoslawien unter der Aegide der Kontaktgruppe am 8. September 1995 in Genf vereinbart,"** **Internationale Politik**. 12/1995. 104-105.

[130] See. "Ein Bitterer Friede," Der Spiegel. 48/1995, 144-145.

[131] See. **"Greift den Strohhalm"** **Der Spiegel**. 48/1995, 148.

[132] See. **"Finger am Abzug,"** **Der Spiegel**. 50/1995, 148. Also, see. **"Unser Ibuk,"** **Der Spiegel.** 52.1995, 36-37.

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